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Understanding why some ﬁrms default, while others do not, is an important issue for
the assessment of ﬁnancial stability. In this domain, it may be interesting to understand
if credit risk is driven mostly by idiosyncratic ﬁrm characteristics or by systematic factors,
which simultaneously aﬀect all ﬁrms. In order to empirically examine the determinants of
loan default, we begin by exploring the links between credit risk and macroeconomic devel-
opments at an aggregate level. The results obtained seem to conﬁrm the hypothesis that
in periods of economic growth, which are sometimes accompanied by strong credit growth,
there may be some tendency towards excessive risk-taking, even though the imbalances
created in such periods only become apparent when economic growth slows down. After
examining the determinants of credit risk at an aggregate level, we focus our attention on an
extensive dataset with detailed ﬁnancial information for more than 30.000 ﬁrms. The results
obtained suggest that default probabilities are inﬂuenced by several ﬁrm-speciﬁc character-
istics, such as their ﬁnancial structure, proﬁtability and liquidity, as well as by their recent
sales performance or their investment policy. When time-eﬀect controls or macroeconomic
variables are taken into account together with the ﬁrms’ characteristics, the results seem
to improve substantially. Hence, though the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial and operational situation has
a central role in explaining default probabilities at the micro level, overall macroeconomic
conditions are also very important when assessing default probabilities over time.
JEL Codes: G21, G33, E32, C25, C41.
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analysis
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Understanding the determinants of credit risk is a major issue for ﬁnancial stability. Banks and
other ﬁnancial intermediaries try to maximise their proﬁts, which requires an accurate pricing
of the risks contained in their assets portfolios. Thereby, given the weight loans to ﬁrms have
on banks’ assets, understanding why do some ﬁrms default, while others do not, may be a
very important question to address. A clearer understanding of credit risk drivers may be an
important contribution to help predict if and when will a ﬁrm default on its credit liabilities.
Against this background, it is interesting to understand if credit default risk is mostly driven
by idiosyncratic or by systematic factors (or both). On one hand, ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics
should clearly be determinant on their decision to default on bank loans. On the other hand,
it has become clearer that macroeconomic developments may also have an important role in
the evolution of credit risk over time. Under this setup, the main purpose of this paper is to
empirically examine the determinants of corporate credit default, taking simultaneously into
account ﬁrm-speciﬁc data as well as macroeconomic information.
The results obtained suggest that there are some important links between credit risk and
macroeconomic developments. In fact, periods of strong economic growth, which are sometimes
accompanied by robust credit growth, are sometimes followed by an increase in default rates,
possibly as a consequence of imbalances generated in those periods. Nevertheless, when micro
information is used to assess the determinants of loan default, it becomes clearer that it is
ultimately the ﬁrms’ own ﬁnancial situation that will determine whether they will default on
their loan commitments. However, it is important to consider that ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial ratios also
vary over the business cycle. Hence, some ﬁrms may be more vulnerable to systematic shocks,
explaining the ﬂuctuation of default rates over the business cycle.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We begin by reviewing some of the litera-
ture in credit risk modelling in Section 2. We also brieﬂy present the modelling setup underlying
the empirical work which will be developed further ahead. In Section 3 we try to understand
some of the links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments at an aggregate level.
For that purpose, we look at correlations between the cyclical components of credit overdue
and of a large set of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables. In Section 4 we ﬁnally look at
ﬁrm-speciﬁc evidence. In this section, we begin by describing the panel dataset used in our
work. In this extensive dataset we have information for more than 30.000 Portuguese ﬁrms
for the period comprised between 1996 and 2002. This dataset contains information on ﬁrms’
credit liabilities as well as detailed accounting information for each ﬁrm. In order to explore
the determinants of loan default at a micro level, we use two diﬀerent econometric techniques.
We begin by using discrete choice models to understand why do some ﬁrms default, but later
we complement our analysis using duration models. The introduction of the time dimension
encompassed in duration models may provide some additional evidence on the timing of loan
default, thereby addressing the question of when do ﬁrms default. Finally, Section 5 presents
some concluding remarks.
22 A brief insight into credit risk modelling
2.1 Review of the literature
One of the ﬁrst major contributions in credit risk modelling literature was provided by Altman
(1968˙ ). In this paper, the author introduced a credit scoring model, usually known as Z-score.
This score is a linear combination of explanatory variables and their respective coeﬃcients,
obtained through discriminant analysis. The set of independent variables comprises several
ﬁnancial ratios, namely 1) working capital to total assets, 2) retained earnings to total assets,
3) earnings before interest and taxes over total assets, 4) the ratio between the market value
of equity and the book value of debt and, ﬁnally, 5) sales over total assets. This score may be
computed at ﬁrm-level, being used to try to predict whether a ﬁrm will become bankrupt or
not, within a certain period of time. There are, however, some caveats in this approach. For
instance, the conclusions obtained with these models may be, to some extent, sample-speciﬁc.
Hence, their application to diﬀerent samples may be somewhat limited.
Another early and important contribution to credit risk modelling was given by Merton
(1974). In this seminal paper, Merton introduced the idea of applying option pricing theory
to the valuation of risky bonds and loans (by modelling loans as zero-coupon bonds with ﬁxed
maturities). In this model, a borrower will have an incentive to default whenever the market
value of the ﬁrm becomes lower than the amount borrowed. The value of the default option (or
the value of the risky loan) will depend on ﬁve variables: the market value of ﬁrm’s assets, the
amount borrowed, the short-term interest rate, the volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets and the loan
maturity. There are several more recent models that draw on this simple modelling framework
introduced by Merton, such as Tudela and Young (2003), for instance.
However, it is possible to identify several drawbacks in Merton’s structural model. First of
all, it is usually pointed out that we cannot observe the ﬁrm’s market value of assets or the
volatility of the ﬁrm’s equity value. These must be approximated using available information,
usually from equity prices, implying that Merton-type models usually can only be applied to
quoted ﬁrms. It can also be argued that in these models, most of the information is subsumed
in share prices and, as a consequence, it is not possible to understand which factors may be
more relevant in determining default probabilities. Furthermore, as mentioned by Bunn and
Redwood (2003), Merton-type models usually provide good ordinal rankings of companies, but
fail to provide accurate probabilities of default. Another drawback of the Merton model is
that, in practice, ﬁrms do not always default when the market value of the ﬁrm becomes lower
than the amount borrowed. As a consequence, it would be more accurate to determine default
probabilities for each value of the ratio between the amount borrowed and the market value of
assets. This is, in part, what underlies the concept of empirical expected default probabilities
(EDFs) in Moody’s KMV model (for further details on this model see Saunders and Allen
(2002) and Moody’s (2004)).
In the late 90’s, discussions concerning the design of the new international bank capital
accord, usually known as Basel II, generated a renewed interest in credit risk modelling. The
new capital accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004)) proposes the use of credit
risk models to determine banks’ capital requirements. Banks can use internal (or external)
3rating models to classify borrowers according to their risk. Capital requirements can then be
determined based on such credit exposure, instead of being constant per credit type, as under
the previous accord. Under this new regulatory setup, it becomes crucial to accurately measure
credit risk. On the one hand, banks must hold enough capital to limit risks for depositors and
to reduce insolvency risks. However, on the other hand, holding excessive capital is costly
and limits eﬃciency. This recent surge in credit risk modelling, to some extent associated
with Basel II, is leading to several new contributions. A brief overview of some of the most
important contributions in this ﬁeld may be found in Crouhy et al (2000), in Gordy (2000)
or, more recently, in Saunders and Allen (2002) or Duﬃe and Singleton (2003). In order to
simplify the description of these recent models, we can try to group them according with their
required inputs. We can identify three diﬀerent groups of models, using this criteria: i) models
which rely mostly on accounting variables, ii) models which use mostly market information,
and iii) models which use macroeconomic variables or which consider default correlation issues.
The ﬁrst group of models borrows from Altman’s (1968) work, even though such variables
can be used under diﬀerent modelling techniques. Some recent work in this domain includes
Bernhardsen (2001), Eklund et al (2001), Bunn and Redwood (2003) or Benito et al (2004). It
should be borne in mind, however, that most of the models here mentioned do not rely solely
on accounting information.
In the second group of models (those which rely mostly on market information), we can
include Merton-type approaches to credit risk modelling (see, for instance, Tudela and Young
(2003), Gersbach and Lipponer (2003) or even Moody’s KMV model (2004)), as well as other
modelling setups, such as Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Shumway (2001) or Couderc and Re-
nault (2005). The major drawback of such models is that, as they rely on market information,
usually they can only be applied to quoted companies. From a prudential regulation view-
point, one might be more interested in assessing the risk in a complete loan portfolio, which
may contain a substantial part of non-quoted ﬁrms (and which are sometimes the riskier com-
panies). This is an important issue when modelling credit risk in Portugal, for instance, as
most corporate borrowers are non-quoted SMEs, which rely mostly on banks as providers of
external funds. Nevertheless, the use of aggregate market information (such as overall stock
market performance or interest rates) may provide useful insights, even when evaluating credit
risk at such ﬁrms.
Finally, we can identify a third set of credit risk models as those which use macroeconomic
variables or consider default correlation issues. Discussions resulting from the implementation
of Basel II made clear that credit risk varies over time and, most notably, it varies with overall
macroeconomic conditions. The main idea is that most risk is built up during upturns, when
banks apply more loose credit standards. However, most of the risk materialises only when
the economy hits a downturn. Some authors, such as Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005), Jiménez
and Saurina (2006), Kent and D’Arcy (2001) or Borio et al (2001) argue that high default
rates during recessions are just a materialisation of the risk that is built up during expansions,
most notably when strong economic growth is accompanied by the creation of unsustainable
ﬁnancial imbalances. Moreover, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) observe that leverage tends to
increase during periods of favourable economic conditions only for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms,
4whereas for ﬁrms without relevant ﬁnancial constraints leverage tends to be counter-cyclical.
Hence, banks should have an over-the-cycle perspective when approving (and pricing) loans in
phases of economic growth (most notably when they are accompanied by strong credit growth),
in order to minimise the impact of possible future losses. It should therefore be emphasised that
t h e r ei sal a r g ed i ﬀerence between potential and observed risk. Wilson (1998), who developed
CreditPortfolioView (McKinsey’s credit risk model), was one of the ﬁrst authors to emphasise
the role macroeconomic variables could have in explaining credit defaults, using a multi-factor
model of systematic default risk. Bangia et al (2002) also had a crucial role in demonstrating
the importance of macroeconomic developments in credit risk. These authors were the ﬁrst
to build transitions matrices conditional on business cycle conditions. Allen and Saunders
(2003) provide a survey of cyclical eﬀects in existing credit risk models. Other authors who
tried to consider business cycle conditions in credit risk models include Lis et al (2000), Nickell
et al (2000), Kent and D’Arcy (2001), Lowe (2002), Berger and Udell (2003), Carling et al
(2002, 2004), Jiménez and Saurina (2006) or Figlewski et al (2006) 1.F u r t h e r m o r e , t a k i n g
into account macroeconomic variables helps us to deal with default correlation issues. In
fact, empirical evidence presented by Rosch (2003) seems to suggest that default correlations
between borrowers increase in economic downturns, as several borrowers are simultaneously hit
by negative systematic shocks.
Our objective is to evaluate simultaneously the eﬀects of some of these dimensions of cor-
porate credit risk. In order to achieve such objective, we will consider ﬁrm-speciﬁca c c o u n t i n g
information, as well as macroeconomic and ﬁnancial data, trying to understand the relative
importance of idiosyncratic and systematic risk factors in the default process.
2.2 Modelling default probabilities
The theoretical modelling setup underlying the empirical analysis which will be developed in
Section 4 draws to some extent on previous work done by Rosch (2003) and Hamerle et al
(2004). Under this modelling framework, we model the default event of ﬁrm i in period t as a
random variable Yit such that:
Yit =
(
1 if ﬁrm i defaults in t
0 otherwise
(1)
The time-discrete hazard rate can be deﬁned as:
λit = Prob (Yit =1 ) (2)
We will consider two vectors of explanatory variables. The ﬁrst one is a set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables, which shall account for idiosyncratic risk (Zit). This vector will include contempora-
neous and lagged variables regarding several dimensions of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation, such
as age, size, asset growth, proﬁtability, leverage and liquidity. The second vector comprises
a set of aggregate time-varying regressors, which intend to account for systematic risk (Xt).
1There is a recent contribution by Koopman et al (2005) which also considers systematic and ﬁrm-speciﬁcr i s k
components. However, in this paper the systematic component is not captured by observable macroeconomic
variables, but rather by the estimation of an unobserved dynamic component.
5These may include variables such as GDP growth, industrial production, conﬁdence levels,
credit growth, interest rates, equity prices (and their volatility) and bond spreads.
We can use a two-state one factor return generating model, which can be used under the
framework of Basel II to calibrate risk weights (Rosch (2003) develops an application using a
similar modelling setup). The discrete-time process for the return on a ﬁrm’s assets (Rit), in a





(1 − ρ)Zit (3)
where Xt ∼ N(0,1), Zit ∼ N(0,1) (normalised returns assumption).
The exposure to the common factor is given by
√
ρ. If we consider that the idiosyncratic
component is independent from the systematic factor, as well as independent across borrowers,
then ρ measures the correlation between the normalised asset returns of any two borrowers.
However, these assumptions may be too strict. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that the
idiosyncratic component is not independent from the systematic factor: when overall economic
conditions deteriorate, it is likely that, for instance, proﬁtability will decline simultaneously for
several ﬁrms, most notably in sectors more sensitive to business cycle conditions. Furthermore,
the assumption of a unique common factor may be too poor if we want to fully understand
which factors are more important in driving default probabilities. So, taking into account these
considerations, the return model may be slightly adapted, yielding:
Rit = ΓXt + ∆Zit (4)
where Γ and ∆ are parameter vectors, which can be estimated through a linear panel model
such as:
Rit = α + γXt + δZit + uit (5)
where α is the model constant term, γ and δ are the estimates of Γ and ∆,a n duit is the
error-term.
The borrower will default if his returns fall below a given threshold cit:
Rit ≤ cit ⇔ Yit =1 (6)
The realisation of the risk drivers Xt and Zit and of the default indicator Yit is observable,
but the returns Rit are not. The link between the risk factors and the default probability can
be accomplished with a threshold model. So, we can redeﬁne the probability of default at time
t for borrower i (time-discrete hazard) as:
λit = Prob(Yit =1 )=Prob(Rit ≤ cit)= (7)
= Prob(ΓXt + ∆Zit ≤ cit)=φ(cit)
where φ(.) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
Taking into account the estimated linear panel model we can write:
6λit(Xt,Z it)=Prob(Yit =1| Xt,Zit)= (8)
= Prob(Rit ≤ cit | Xt,Zit)=
= Prob(α + γXt + δZit + uit ≤ cit | Xt,Zit)=
= Prob(uit ≤ cit − α − γXt − δZit | Xt,Zit)=
= F(˜ α +˜ γXt + ˜ δZit)
where F(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the error term, ˜ α = cit − α
(assuming cit = c,∀it), ˜ γ = −γ and ˜ δ = −δ.
Before exploring the information available at the ﬁrm-level, we will begin by trying to draw
some conclusions on the relationship between credit risk and macroeconomic information at an
aggregate level. Hence, this modelling setup will be applied further ahead, in Section 4, where
we will thoroughly use micro data to assess the determinants of default probabilities at the
ﬁrm-level.
3 Credit risk and macroeconomic dynamics: an aggregate ap-
proach
Before looking at evidence provided by ﬁrm-level data, we will try to understand some of the
links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments at an aggregate level. In order to
achieve such objective, we built up correlation matrices between the cyclical components of
credit overdue and of a large set of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables. These matrices
may provide a clearer understanding of the cyclical comovement between credit overdue and
other variables, which can later be used as explanatory variables under a regression analysis
framework, together with ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s .
3.1 Data and methodology
In order to evaluate the relationship between credit risk and macroeconomic developments,
we gathered a large set of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial time series2. In this analysis, credit
default is measured as credit and interest which have become overdue within the last 3 to
6m o n t h s 3. There is, however, one caveat in using this measure of credit overdue: it is not
possible to separately assess the evolution of non-ﬁnancial corporations’ and households’ credit
overdue. To partly overcome this issue, estimations were also performed using the stock of non-
performing loans of non-ﬁnancial corporations, though this stock variable should not perform
so well in capturing the dynamics of new credit overdue.
Macroeconomic and ﬁnancial series include information on national accounts, inﬂation,
labour market data, loans, loan loss provisions, interest rates and stock market prices. All time
2Data sources are listed in Appendix A.
3An alternative would be to use instead credit overdue for a period shorter than 3 months, but this variable
may display some spurious volatility. Nevertheless, all the estimations described below were also performed
considering this shorter horizon of credit overdue. The results proved to be generally robust.
7series, considered at a quarterly frequency, were detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter4.
The cyclical components obtained through ﬁltering were then used to compute correlations
with our aggregate credit risk measure, considering several time lags.
3.2 Some results
As mentioned above, the analysis of the cyclical components of several macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial variables (and of their correlation with non-performing loans) may shed some light on
the links between credit risk and overall macroeconomic developments. A large set of time series
was taken into account. Table 1 reports some of the most signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcients
obtained for the period comprised between 1990Q1 and 2004Q45.
First of all, the correlation between loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations at t and credit
overdue at t +5is quite high and positive (0.64), as illustrated in the ﬁrst panel of Table 1.
This evidence helps to support the hypothesis that most credit risk is built up during periods of
strong credit growth, materialising only when the economy hits a downturn, as discussed above
(see Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005) or Jiménez and Saurina (2006), for instance). In turn, the
correlation between loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations at t and credit overdue at t − 8 is also
relatively high, but it is now negative (-0.41), implying that a strong growth in credit overdue
at t is correlated with a contraction in total credit at t +8 . This may suggest that banks
apply tighter standards on loan approval after a period in which non-performing loans increase
signiﬁcantly. Moreover, in a period of economic slowdown, loan demand is expected to remain
subdued.
The cyclical component of provisions has, as expected, a positive correlation with new credit
overdue. The correlation is stronger when provisions for general credit risks are added up to
speciﬁc provisions (total provisions)6.
The cyclical component of GDP displays a positive leading correlation with the cycle of
credit overdue (the strongest correlation is seen between GDP at t and new credit overdue at
t +8 ). This result implies that a period of robust economic growth is usually followed by an
increase in new credit overdue, with a lag of at least two years. This result is also important
to conﬁrm the hypothesis that in periods of economic growth there may be some tendency
towards excessive risk-taking, which materialises in an increase of credit overdue only when the
economy hits a downturn. The negative contemporaneous correlation is particularly strong if
we consider the stock of non-ﬁnancial corporations’ non-performing loans instead of the ﬂow of
new credit overdue. In sum, in periods of strong economic growth imbalances may be building
up. According to our results, these imbalances start to be gradually reﬂected in new credit
overdue with a lag of at least two years. Then, the growth of new credit overdue is progressively
reﬂected in an increase of the stock of non-performing loans. When the cyclical component of
non-performing loans reaches its peak (that is, when credit risk fully materialises), the cycle
4The smoothing parameter was set to be 1600.
5The correlation coeﬃcients displayed in Table 1 refer to the correlation of each variable with the cyclical
component of the (log) amount of credit overdue for a period comprised between 3 and 6 months, taking into
account quarterly data.
6Provisions for general credit risks are a function of total credit granted, whereas speciﬁc provisions are built
up when credit overdue is recorded in banks’ balance sheets.
8xt: i = -8 i = -7 i = -6 i = -5 i = -4 i = -3 i = -2 i = -1 i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 i = 6 i = 7 i = 8
Loans
Loans to non-financial corp. -0.41 -0.32 -0.28 -0.18 -0.03 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.52 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.50 0.43
   Agriculture -0.22 -0.07 0.08 0.19 0.37 0.46 0.41 0.35 0.36 0.21 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.22
   Mining -0.27 -0.21 -0.12 -0.03 0.11 0.27 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.48
   Manufacturing -0.28 -0.17 -0.14 -0.07 0.05 0.19 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.47 0.52 0.64 0.63 0.55 0.46 0.46 0.45
   Utilities -0.38 -0.29 -0.17 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.54 0.60 0.51
   Construction -0.46 -0.38 -0.29 -0.14 0.02 0.15 0.26 0.33 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.40 0.26
   Services -0.38 -0.32 -0.31 -0.23 -0.08 0.14 0.25 0.30 0.41 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.65 0.60 0.47 0.40
Provisions
Specific loan loss provisions 0.48 0.30 0.29 0.46 0.50 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.09 -0.29 -0.44 -0.48 -0.45 -0.39 -0.43 -0.23 -0.02
Total provisions 0.12 -0.01 -0.13 0.06 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.52 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.54 0.57 0.45 0.47 0.47
National accounts
Private consumption -0.40 -0.38 -0.40 -0.30 -0.17 -0.12 -0.04 0.12 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.40 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.69 0.74
   Durables -0.48 -0.39 -0.43 -0.36 -0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.19 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.17 0.33 0.45 0.45 0.57 0.66
   Non-durables -0.26 -0.29 -0.30 -0.20 -0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.27 0.40 0.32 0.31 0.47 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.62 0.63
Public consumption -0.46 -0.47 -0.43 -0.36 -0.24 -0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.52 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.67
GFCF -0.61 -0.58 -0.50 -0.46 -0.40 -0.42 -0.38 -0.33 -0.27 -0.15 0.04 0.24 0.38 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.53
Exports -0.10 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.21 -0.37 -0.42 -0.49 -0.54 -0.38 -0.29 -0.19 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.10
   Goods 0.03 0.13 0.20 0.11 -0.05 -0.24 -0.37 -0.49 -0.54 -0.40 -0.34 -0.29 -0.19 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05
   Services -0.37 -0.41 -0.34 -0.40 -0.42 -0.43 -0.32 -0.27 -0.31 -0.20 -0.04 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.32 0.36
Imports -0.38 -0.31 -0.25 -0.31 -0.36 -0.47 -0.41 -0.40 -0.46 -0.34 -0.15 -0.04 0.14 0.29 0.38 0.37 0.42
   Goods -0.37 -0.28 -0.22 -0.27 -0.34 -0.44 -0.39 -0.40 -0.47 -0.36 -0.20 -0.09 0.09 0.26 0.36 0.34 0.41
   Services -0.16 -0.28 -0.28 -0.30 -0.23 -0.33 -0.31 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.21 0.32 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.21
GDP -0.52 -0.45 -0.39 -0.26 -0.14 -0.16 -0.20 -0.16 -0.04 0.08 0.14 0.35 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.56 0.57
Other economic indicators
Coincident indic. for econ. act. -0.57 -0.60 -0.60 -0.59 -0.56 -0.54 -0.52 -0.45 -0.36 -0.26 -0.13 0.01 0.16 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.44
Inflation
CPI growth 0.08 0.24 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.29 0.45 0.58 0.54 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.35 0.16 0.11 0.15
Bank interest rates
Interest rate on firms -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.21 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.18 -0.13 0.10 0.24 0.27 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.30
Interest rate housing -0.20 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.29 -0.26 -0.22 -0.17 -0.13 0.12 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.28
Interest rate households other -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.19 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.20 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.29
Stock market data
PSI Geral -0.35 -0.31 -0.36 -0.46 -0.38 -0.31 -0.39 -0.41 -0.37 -0.17 -0.07 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.27
PSI 20 -0.32 -0.26 -0.29 -0.36 -0.25 -0.14 -0.20 -0.18 -0.10 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.33 0.23 0.11 0.26
Bond yields
Gov bond DE 5 -0.22 -0.11 0.00 0.12 0.16 0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 0.04 0.22 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.34
Gov bond DE 10 -0.04 0.07 0.14 0.23 0.28 0.13 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.16 -0.01 0.16 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.30
Gov bond EMU 10 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.16 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.09 0.06 0.13 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.34
Correlation coefficient of xt with credit overduet+i
Table 1
Note: This table reports correlation coefficients between the cyclical component of each listed variable at t (xt) and the cyclical component of credit overdue at different time 
periods (credit overduet+i), using quarterly information for the period comprised between 1990Q1 and 2004Q4 (except for Government bond yields, for which only slightly 
shorter time series are available). This definition of credit overdue comprises credit and interest overdue for more than 3 and less than 6 months. The highest correlation for 
each variable is highlighted in grey. The coincident indicator for economic activity refers to the cyclical component underlying the construction of this business cycle indicator.
9of GDP is at its trough, resulting in a strong negative contemporaneous correlation between
these two variables7.
In what concerns GDP components, the results are rather mixed. On the one hand, the
cyclical component of private (and public) consumption displays a positive leading correla-
tion with the cycle of new credit overdue. On the other hand, the cyclical components of
investment (measured by gross ﬁxed capital formation), imports and exports display a nega-
tive lagged correlation. This may suggest that credit imbalances are usually more associated
with consumption-driven expansions, though this conclusion may be very sensitive to the time
interval considered.
Bank interest rates display a positive correlation with the cyclical component of new credit
overdue and are leading variables. In fact, their strongest correlation is seen at t+4, suggesting
that an increase in credit overdue is often preceded by an interest rate increase. This result may
be associated, on one hand, with the increase of interest rates during periods of stronger and
prolonged economic growth, which are sometimes followed by an increase in credit overdue, as
discussed above. Additionally, a sizeable increase in interest rates implies a higher debt service,
w h i c hm a yp u ts o m es t r a i no nh i g h l yl e v e r a g e dﬁrms. On the other hand, when interest rates
increase signiﬁcantly, adverse selection problems may become more frequent, implying higher
default rates some periods afterwards8.
Government bond yields display a pattern similar to that of bank interest rates. Stock
market indices exhibit a negative correlation, implying that positive developments in stock
market prices, which usually reﬂect a broad-based improvement in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial condition,
are usually associated with lower default ratios, as should be expected.
The links between credit default and macroeconomic developments will be further explored
in the next section, by taking simultaneously into account ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic
variables under a regression analysis framework. The insight provided by the analysis of cyclical
components will then be helpful in choosing the set of explanatory variables to be considered.
4 The contribution of ﬁrm level information to understand loan
default
In the previous section we discussed some of the determinants of loan default at an aggregate
level, using macroeconomic and ﬁnancial time series. However, ﬁrm level data may provide a
much richer insight of credit risk drivers. Even though macroeconomic and ﬁnancial conditions
may oﬀer a valuable contribution to explain credit risk at an aggregate level, it is the ﬁrm’s
speciﬁc ﬁnancial situation that will ultimately determine whether it will default on its liabilities.
7Most of the empirical literature on credit risk modelling focuses on the cross-section rather than on the
time-series dimension of credit risk. An exception is a recent work by Koopman and Lucas (2005), which uses
a multivariate unobserved components approach to evaluate the dynamic behaviour of business failures, credit
spreads and GDP in the United States, using considerably long time series (1933-1997). The authors ﬁnd
evidence of negative co-cyclicality between GDP and business failures for long business cycles (with an average
duration of 11 years) and a positive relationship between the cyclical component of business failures and credit
spreads.
8Borrowers with projects which entail relatively low risks may consider that interest rates are higher than
what is deemed adequate to ensure minimum proﬁtability levels, thus introducing a potential bias in banks’ loan
portfolios towards riskier borrowers.
10As a consequence, taking into account ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such as leverage, proﬁtability
or solvency, may provide a clearer understanding of which factors drive credit risk. Moreover,
as argued by Benito et al (2004) or Bunn and Redwood (2003), the use of ﬁrm-level data may
improve the precision and accuracy of empirical estimates, by exploring how the combination of
factors at the micro-level inﬂuences credit risk, taking advantage from the greater variability in
such datasets. Furthermore, ﬁrm-level data allow us to take into account distributional issues,
instead of focusing only on mean behaviour. For example, it is possible to separately consider
credit risk for diﬀerent economic sectors, for diﬀerent ﬁrm size cohorts or even to separately
look at ﬁrms which have previously defaulted.
In this section we will explore an extensive and detailed dataset which comprises informa-
tion on more than 30.000 Portuguese ﬁrms. We will begin by describing the dataset, presenting
some revealing summary statistics. Then we will brieﬂy describe the econometric methodology
used. First we use discrete choice models to better understand what drives ﬁrms’ loan defaults.
Afterwards, we complement our analysis using duration models. The time dimension encom-
passed in duration models allows us to focus on the time it takes for a loan to default, rather
than simply considering whether or not ﬁrms default.
4.1 Data and summary statistics
The microeconomic dataset used in this work comprises two distinct datasets held by Banco de
Portugal, namely, the Central Credit Register and the Central Balance Sheet Database. The
Central Credit Register provides information on all credit exposures above 50 euro in Portugal.
The information contained in this database is reported by credit institutions (reporting is
mandatory) and its main objective is sharing information between participant institutions,
in order to improve their credit risk assessment and management. This database contains
monthly information on loans granted to ﬁrms and households, including their current status
(it is possible to know whether credit has become overdue, if it was written-oﬀ banks’ balance
sheets, if it was renegotiated or if it is an oﬀ-balance sheet risk, such as the unused parts of
credit lines or bank guarantees)9. Using end-of-year data for the period comprised between
1996 and 2002, we have 203.655 observations10. The Central Balance Sheet Database provides
detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese ﬁrms, being used mostly for
economic and statistical purposes. We use annual data, though quarterly data is also available
for a smaller set of ﬁrms. Reporting is not compulsory, but the sample is considered to be
representative. Nevertheless, there may exist some bias towards larger ﬁrms. Even though this
bias represents a shortcoming of this database, it still is an extremely rich and unique dataset
on non-ﬁnancial corporations. Furthermore, even though smaller companies may, in some
cases, present higher default probabilities, they do not usually hold large amounts of debt. The
systemic implications of a ﬁrm’s failure result not only from its default probability, but mostly
from its debt at risk (default probability multiplied by the ﬁrm’s total debt). For instance,
9Reporting banks aggregate information on loans with similar status for each ﬁrm (information is not reported
on a loan by loan basis). There is no information on loan maturity, collateral or interest rates. In what concerns
loan maturity, nearly half of the loans granted to non-ﬁnancial corporations in the period under analysis had
maturities above one year, taking into account aggregate statistics.
10In order to merge the two datasets, loans were aggregated within ﬁrms. Hence, one observation is deﬁned
a sap a i rﬁrm-year, summing up all credit liabilities for a given ﬁrm in each year.
11Benito et al (2004), using a similar database for Spanish ﬁrms, ﬁnd that overall ﬁnancial risk
in the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector is highly concentrated in a few large ﬁrms, not because of
their high default probability, but rather because of their size. As a consequence, even though
micro and small ﬁrms may be under-represented in this sample, they account only for a small
part of banks’ total credit exposures. In this dataset we have 153.581 observations for the
period comprised between 1996 and 2002. Merging the two databases we obtain a dataset
containing 113.119 observations, comprising 33.084 ﬁrms.
We constructed several ratios and indicators to evaluate each ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial situation,
namely in what concerns their proﬁtability, ﬁnancial structure, leverage, productivity, liquidity
and investment. A detailed description of the ratios used to assess ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial conditions
is presented in Appendix B. In order to avoid spurious results, all the ratios for which the
denominator equalled (or was close to) zero were considered as missing values. Furthermore,
some ratios in which a negative denominator (such as equity) was combined with a negative
numerator (such as proﬁts) were also considered as missing values, in order to avoid misleading
results. In both cases, in order to avoid loosing information, these variables were excluded
from the regression analysis whenever possible and equivalent ratios without such problems
were taken into account. Finally, in variables where there were signiﬁcant outliers, we replaced
observations above the 99th percentile with the value of that percentile (the same procedure
was applied to observations below the 1st percentile, whenever necessary).
In Table 2 we present some descriptive statistics, in order to shortly characterize the sam-
ple of ﬁrms under analysis. On average, each ﬁrm in the sample has 54 employees, implying
that we are dealing mostly with small and medium enterprises. Net proﬁts show a remark-
able dispersion, ranging from extremely negative values to considerably high positive values.
Proﬁtability ratios are, on average, relatively low. Average return on equity stands at 5.2 per
cent and return on assets is negative for nearly a quarter of the ﬁrms included in the sam-
ple. Sales growth rates also show a high dispersion within the sample. The same is true for
the solvency ratio, deﬁned as equity as a percentage of total assets. The lower the value of
this ratio, the higher is the ﬁrm’s dependence on external funding sources. Credit accounts
for 11.5 per cent of ﬁrms’ assets, on average, though there are very diﬀerent situations in the
sample (this ratio varies between 0 and 80 per cent). Capital and labour productivity, which
assess the productive contribution of the inputs used by ﬁrms, also vary considerably within
the sample. The capital-labour coeﬃcient, measured as the ratio between tangible assets and
the number of employees, allows to control for the ﬁrm’s capital intensity, which should vary
considerably across speciﬁc economic activities. The investment rate, measured as new invest-
ment (deducted from depreciations) over total sales, is relatively low (2.3 per cent, on average).
This ratio should reﬂect, to some extent, the investment and growth policy followed by each
ﬁrm, though it should be conditioned by the sector in which the ﬁrm operates or by its age,
for instance. On average, ﬁrms included in the sample are 16 years old. The liquidity ratio,
which evaluates short-term assets as a percentage of the ﬁrm’s debt, is signiﬁcantly above 100
per cent, on average, implying that a large part of the ﬁrms included in the sample displays
sustainable liquidity levels during the period considered. Only a small percentage of ﬁrms in
the sample has credit overdue. In fact, on average, credit overdue represents only 1 per cent
12N mean sd min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 max skewness kurtosis N mean
Total assets 113,119 8,902,194 125,000,000 339 57,746 231,911 688,261 2,404,954 19,200,000 13,000,000,000 55.4 4,264 71,058 8,139,104
Employees 113,119 54 286 1 2 5 13 35 188 18688 33.1 1,570 71,058 55
Net profits 113,119 196,367 7,502,392 -359,000,000 -128,450 155 6,569 36,836 497,501 1,130,000,000 45.7 5,898 71,058 129,289
ROA 113,119 0.5 14 -200.0 -15.9 0.0 1.2 4.1 14.0 200.0 -4.9 69.7 71,058 0.8
ROE 100,662 5.2 46 -282.0 -44.3 0.8 6.0 16.8 55.8 145.4 -3.1 22.0 64,665 4.8
Oper. results as % of equity 100,662 25.8 63 -225.2 -34.9 4.3 17.1 38.6 116.8 351.5 1.3 13.7 64,665 24.5
Sales growth 80,035 12.8 49 -100.0 -38.0 -7.7 5.3 21.1 81.4 308.8 3.3 19.1 71,058 12.9
Solvency ratio 113,119 23.5 33 -139.1 -25.6 10.7 24.6 40.5 71.4 100.0 -1.7 10.0 71,058 24.6
Total credit as a % assets 113,119 11.5 16 0.0 0.0 1.2 4.7 14.7 47.1 80.2 2.1 7.6 71,058 14.9
Labour productivity 113,119 118,798 181,643 3 11,840 29,043 58,423 128,071 420,464 1,231,148 3.9 20.9 71,058 121,514
Capital productivity 112,332 2,492 6,709 0 71 262 642 1,750 9,574 51,393 5.6 37.1 70,735 2,318
K_L coefficient 113,119 22,962 44,404 0 613 3,675 9,476 23,175 81,972 328,962 4.8 29.6 71,058 23,371
Investment rate 80,035 2.3 16 -49.1 -12.9 -2.3 -0.1 3.4 25.0 98.3 2.7 18.6 71,058 2.5
Firm age (years) 113,119 16 16 0 2 6 12 21 48 100 2.5 10.6 71,058 18
Liquidity ratio 112,618 125 116 0 27 73 102 133 295 865 4.1 23.5 71,058 120
Liquid assets to total assets 112,655 68 24 0 21 52 73 89 98 100 -0.7 2.6 71,058 68
Credit overdue 113,119 5,327 211,443 0 0 0 0 0 0 44,600,000 118 20,021 71,058 995
Credit overdue as % total credit 103,201 1.03 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 9.8 102.5 71,058 0.30
Dummy credit overdue 103,201 0.03 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 5.5 31.5 71,058 0.02
Note: total assets, net profits and credit overdue are presented in euros. ROA, ROE, operational results as % of equity, sales growth, the solvency ratio, total credit as a % of assets, 
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of total bank loans11. The mean value of the dummy variable credit overdue (which takes the
value 1 when a ﬁrm records a loan default) can be interpreted as a historical default probability,
standing at 3 per cent during the period under analysis (we observe 3084 defaults, using end of
year data). The higher default frequencies are seen in ﬁshing, mining, tourism and restaurants,
and manufacturing, as illustrated in the second panel of Table 2.
The highest default frequencies are recorded by medium-sized ﬁrms, closely followed by large
ﬁrms, as depicted in the last panel of Table 212. Hence, ﬁrms in default seem to be slightly
bigger ﬁrms, contrary to what is usually seen in the literature. For instance, Bhattacharjee et
al (2002), Bunn and Redwood (2003), Eklund et al (2001) and Jiménez and Saurina (2004) ﬁnd
11Taking into account only those ﬁrms which actually default, credit overdue represents, on average, 34 per
cent of their total loans.
12However, the average amount of credit overdue as a percentage of total credit is higher for medium and
micro ﬁrms. For robustness, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of ﬁrm size were tested, but these results remain valid.
13that smaller ﬁrms are more likely to default. In turn, Pain and Vesala (2004) and Bernhardsen
(2001) conclude that any systemic eﬀect of ﬁrm size on default is relatively small. Furthermore,
there is also contrary evidence on the impact of ﬁrm size in the literature. According to
Moody’s (2004), larger ﬁrms default less often, but when ﬁnancial statement ratios are taken
into account, the impact of the size advantage declines. Hence, a small ﬁrm with healthy
ﬁnancial ratios should not be riskier than a large ﬁrm with comparable ﬁnancial statements.
Finally, Benito et al (2004) obtain a result similar to ours, observing a positive relationship
between ﬁrm size and default rates (the authors argue that their database may be biased
towards "good" companies, which may also be a problem in our database).
One of our main objectives is to understand what drives credit risk at the ﬁrm-level. This
c a nb ep a r t l ya c c o m p l i s h e db yl o o k i n gseparately at summary statistics for ﬁrms which record
a loan default at t, comparing them with the remaining ﬁrms. In Table 3 we present the
mean values for these two groups of ﬁrms for several potentially interesting variables. A brief
analysis conﬁrms that ﬁrms with loan defaults seem in fact to diﬀer from other ﬁrms. The
proﬁtability of ﬁrms in default is, as expected, considerably lower (their return on assets is, on
average, negative). Furthermore, sales growth is also lower for these ﬁrms, though positive. The
solvency ratio suggests that ﬁrms in default are more dependent of external funding sources.
In fact, the ratio of credit to total assets and the leverage ratio conﬁrm that these are more
indebted ﬁrms. Investment rates for troubled ﬁrms are also considerably lower. The liquidity
ratio is also lower (and below 100 per cent, on average) for ﬁrms in default, revealing that these
ﬁrms are usually subject to stronger liquidity pressures, as should be expected. On average,
ﬁrms in default are slightly older, which is not quite what should be expected. Again, there
is mixed evidence in the literature in what concerns the impact of ﬁrm age. Younger ﬁrms
should be more sensitive to external shocks and should be expected to show higher bankruptcy
probabilities, as argued by Eklund et al (2001), for instance. In turn, Shumway (2001) ﬁnds
no evidence of duration dependence in bankruptcy probabilities (ﬁrm age is never statistically
signiﬁcant, after controlling for other ﬁrm characteristics). The positive correlation between
ﬁrm age and default frequencies in our sample may reﬂect positive duration dependence: the
longer the ﬁrm is at risk, the higher should be its default probability. This issue will be
discussed in more detail with the results obtained using duration models. Finally, taking into
account mean values for both groups, the results obtained conﬁrm that ﬁrms in default are, on
average, slightly larger than the remaining ﬁrms in the sample.
In order to more accurately test if these variables are in fact diﬀerent for ﬁrms which
default, we also present in Table 3 the results of a mean comparison Welch test13. For all
variables considered, the mean values for ﬁrms in default are statistically diﬀerent from the
mean values observed for ﬁrms without default (with the exception of total assets, for which the
mean value is not statistically diﬀerent between the two groups of ﬁrms)14. Hence, the set of
variables considered in this table may contribute to explain why do some ﬁrms default, under a
regression analysis framework. Furthermore, we also computed pairwise correlations for all the
13This test should be more adequate than the more common mean comparison Satterthwaite test, given that
variances should diﬀer between the two groups of ﬁrms.
14Pairwise mean comparison tests performed between micro, small, medium and large ﬁrms conﬁrmed that
diﬀerences in average default frequencies between these groups are statistically signiﬁcant.
14Ha: diff not 0
Pr( |T| > |t| )
ROA 0.5 -4.9 15.18 3178 5.4 0.00 Y
Sales growth 12.9 5.7 5.74 2252 7.2 0.00 Y
Solvency ratio 23.2 1.1 26.32 3171 22.1 0.00 Y
Total credit as a % assets 12.5 16.9 -12.02 3209 -4.4 0.00 Y
Leverage 76.8 98.9 -26.32 3171 -22.1 0.00 Y
Investment rate 2.6 -2.5 11.89 2248 5.1 0.00 Y
Liquidity ratio 119.0 86.5 20.75 3356 32.5 0.00 Y
Firm age 16.3 18.6 -7.52 3252 -2.3 0.00 Y
Total assets 9123577 9771957 -0.17 3149 -648380 0.87 N
Employees 53.6 59.3 -2.47 4389 -5.7 0.01 Y
Number of observations 100117 3084
diff = mean (no 
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variables in the dataset, identifying which pairwise correlations are signiﬁcant at a 5 per cent
signiﬁcance level. This correlation matrix was used as a guidance tool to choose relevant ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables, as well as to identify possible multicollinearity problems
between explanatory variables.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of historical default frequencies during the sample period,
depicted against the economic activity coincident indicator. Until 2000, there was a steady
decline in default frequencies, accompanied by positive economic developments. The deterio-
ration of economic conditions was then mirrored (with some lag) by an increase in observed
default frequencies, as well as in the amount of credit overdue as a percentage of total credit.
The empirical distribution of this latter ratio is depicted in Figure 2, using a gaussian kernel
density. The distribution of this ratio is clearly two-peaked: either ﬁr m sr e c o r do n l ys m a l l
amounts of credit overdue (as a percentage of their total credit liabilities), which may reﬂect
transitory episodes of delinquency, or they default on nearly all their debt, which should be a
situation closer to bankruptcy. In this domain, it may be interesting to notice the diﬀerences
seen when ﬁrm size is taken into account. As mentioned above, large and medium-sized ﬁrms
display higher default rates, in contrast to what is usually found in the literature. Nevertheless,
the empirical distribution of the ratio between credit overdue and total credit is remarkably
diﬀerent for ﬁrms with diﬀerent sizes, as illustrated in Figure 3. In fact, whereas the distribution
for micro ﬁrms is clearly two-peaked (which is, to a lesser extent, also true for small ﬁrms), the
distribution for medium and, most notably, for large ﬁrms is clearly single-peaked. This result
15Figure 2
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may suggest that even though larger ﬁrms display higher default frequencies in our sample,
these usually reﬂect small and, most likely, transitory episodes of loan default. Larger ﬁrms
may have fewer diﬃculties in overcoming credit problems in part because banks may be more
willing to renegotiate impaired loans, in order to avoid sizeable losses.
By setting up a transition matrix, it is possible to evaluate historical default probabilities
at diﬀerent time horizons. In Table 4 (panel A) are presented average default frequencies at
diﬀerent time horizons and for diﬀerent years. Default probabilities are fairly stable during the
ﬁrst years (decreasing slightly until t +3 ), but increase considerably afterwards. Such pattern
may signal positive duration dependence: the longer the ﬁrm is at risk, the higher should be its
default probability. By deﬁning conditional transition probabilities, we can trace separately the
evolution of the risk proﬁle of ﬁrms which are in default at t (Table 4.B). We can see that this
evolution is extremely diﬀerent for ﬁrms with and without default at t.F o rﬁrms which are not
in default at t, default probabilities are clearly increasing over time, which was not clear when
we considered all ﬁrms in the sample. In turn, for ﬁrms which have defaulted at t, recovery
probabilities (deﬁned as 100 per cent less the default probability) are markedly increasing and
larger than 75 per cent after 6 years. Finally, we can also build conditional transition matrices
for ﬁrms without any prior default (in the sample period) and also for ﬁrms which did not
default at t, but which recorded at least one previous default episode in the sample period, as
depicted in Table 4.C (this latter group has a very limited number of observations). Default
probabilities seem to be slightly lower for ﬁrms without any previous default in the sample
period, though their time evolution is similar to those with no default at t. In turn, for ﬁrms
which are not in default at t but had some previous default in the sample period, default
probabilities are considerably higher, implying that ﬁrms with a past record of credit overdue
are more likely to default again in the future than ﬁrms that never defaulted before.
4.2 Econometric methodology
A common approach in empirical credit risk literature is to use standard discrete choice models,
such as logit or probit models (see, for instance, Benito et al (2004), Bernhardsen (2001), Bunn
and Redwood (2003), Hamerle (2004) or Campbell et al (2005))15. These models can be used
15For details on discrete choice modelling under a panel data framework see Wooldridge (2002), Hsiao (1986),
Baltagi (1995) and Maddala and Rao (1996).
16Figure 3
 Empirical distribution function of the credit overdue ratio by firm size
(gaussian kernel density)
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to empirically examine credit risk drivers, assessing their relative importance in determining
whether ﬁrms default on their credit liabilities. Recalling equation 8, we want to estimate a
linear panel model such as:
λit(Xt,Z it)=Prob(Yit =1| Xt,Zit)= (9)
= F(˜ α +˜ γXt + ˜ δZit)
The model to be estimated will depend on the assumption made on the error distribution
function F(.). Assuming a standard normal distribution function Θ(.) yields a probit model
such that:
λit(Xt,Z it)=Θ(˜ α +˜ γXt + ˜ δZit) (10)
If instead we assumed that the error term follows a logistic distribution, we would have:
λit(Xt,Z it)=
exp(˜ α +˜ γXt + ˜ δZit)
1+e x p (˜ α +˜ γXt + ˜ δZit)
(11)














F(˜ α +˜ γXt + ˜ δZit)Yit(1 − F(˜ α +˜ γXt + ˜ δZit))(1−Yit)
i
(12)
17t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
1996 3.99 3.51 3.29 2.61 2.29 3.41 3.73
1997 3.23 3.13 2.54 2.26 3.39 3.63 -
1998 2.90 2.51 2.22 3.30 3.52 - -
1999 2.38 2.12 3.14 3.41 - - -
2000 2.07 3.00 3.26 - - - -
2001 2.86 3 . 2 4-----
2002 3.16 ------
A v e r a g e2 . 9 92 . 9 52 . 8 92 . 8 63 . 0 43 . 5 23 . 7 3
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
Firms with no 
default at t
0.00 1.63 2.06 2.23 2.57 3.07 3.34
Firms in 
default at t 100.00 54.62 42.41 36.72 31.45 30.04 23.97
Average 2.99 2.95 2.89 2.86 3.04 3.52 3.73
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
1996 0.00 1.52 2.13 1.81 1.65 2.84 3.34
1997 0.00 1.53 1.51 1.44 2.72 3.19 -
1998 0.00 1.19 1.23 2.61 2.98 - -
1999 0.00 0.83 2.19 2.67 - - -
2000 0.00 1.95 2.42 - - - -
2001 0.00 1.91 - - - - -
2002 0 . 0 0------
Average 0.00 1.48 1.89 2.09 2.42 3.01 3.34
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
1996 -------
1997 0.0 8.5 8.3 6.9 16.0 13.1 -
1998 0.0 9.5 12.9 14.6 17.6 - -
1999 0.0 10.1 13.7 15.9 - - -
2000 0.0 12.8 16.8 - - - -
2001 0 . 0 1 2 . 9-----
2002 0 . 0------
Average 0.0 10.9 13.4 13.4 16.9 13.1 -
Default prob. at different time horizons for firms without default at t but with prior defaults (%)
Default probabilities at different time horizons (%)
B - Conditional transition matrix
Default probabilities at different time horizons (%)
C - Transition matrix for firms with and without default
A - Transition matrix
Table 4
Default probabilities at different time horizons for firms without any prior default (%)
18Discrete choice models may provide an interesting assessment of the determinants of loan
default, helping to determine whether or not a ﬁrm with given characteristics is likely to default.
However, it would also be important to focus on the time dimension of default, understanding
not only if a ﬁrm will default, but also when will that eventually occur. The timing of loan
default is important for establishing a complete risk evaluation, as well as for accurate loan
pricing and provisioning. Duration models directly model the survival time of a loan, taking as
a dependent variable the time until default. Although not so common, there are some recent
applications of survival analysis to credit risk modelling, such as Banasik et al (1999), Carling
et al (2002, 2004) or Couderc and Renault (2005)16.
Duration models may provide some advantages over discrete choice models, given that
they can more easily incorporate the progressive deterioration of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation
before default, as they control for each ﬁrm’s time at risk, as argued by Shumway (2001). In
addition, empirical evidence suggests that there may be duration dependence in default risk:
ﬁrm age (or time at risk) may be an important explanatory variable, as found by Carling et al
(2002, 2004) or Saretto (2004)17. Therefore, traditional logit and probit models, which imply
constant hazard rates, may be less accurate than duration models18. Furthermore, the explicit
introduction of the time dimension in duration models may provide better results when taking
into account macroeconomic variables, as argued by Bhattacharjee et al (2002). Despite all the
advantages provided by duration models, their application to our dataset is somewhat limited,
given that there is a strong left censoring problem: most ﬁrms in the dataset were created
before 1996, implying that ﬁrms’ time at risk is, for most observations, much larger than the
observation period. Though econometric software can handle this, it still limits the conclusions
to be drawn from duration models. Hence, duration models will be used mostly to complement
and verify the empirical ﬁndings obtained with discrete choice models.
Under the duration modelling framework, we deﬁne T as the time until a loan defaults19.
The hazard function can be deﬁned as the probability of a ﬁrm defaulting on a short interval
[t,t + dt), conditional on not having defaulted before:
h(t)= l i m
dt→0
Prob(t ≤ T<t+ dt | T ≥ t)
dt
(13)
The hazard function represents an instantaneous rate of default per unit of time. The
duration distribution function can be deﬁned as F(t )=Prob(T<t ). The survival function is
the probability of surviving up to t,a n dc a nb ed e ﬁned as:












16Shumway (2001), Bhattacharjee et al (2002), Roszbach (2004), Saretto (2004) and Antunes (2005) also use
duration models, but to address slightly diﬀerent issues of credit risk.
17As discussed in the previous sub-section, in our dataset there seems to be evidence in favour of positive
duration dependence, given that older ﬁrms display higher default frequencies.
18Nevertheless, the inclusion of a duration variable, such as ﬁrm age, in logit or probit models, should yield
results similar to those obtained with duration models.
19Lancaster (1990) provides one of the most complete presentations of duration models. Wooldridge (2002)
also provides a brief introduction to these models under a panel data framework.
19Whenever T has an exponential distribution, the hazard function h(t) is constant. When the
hazard function is not constant, the underlying process is said to exhibit duration dependence.
If
δh(t)
δt > 0, ∀t, there is positive duration dependence, which implies that, in our framework,
the probability of default increases with time, for ﬁrms which have never defaulted before. If,
on the contrary,
δh(t)
δt < 0, ∀t, there is evidence in favour of negative duration dependence (the
longer the ﬁrm has remained without defaulting, the lower should be its default probability).
If ﬁrms were homogenous, the setup described above could be directly applied. However, we
want to focus on the opposite assumption, understanding which ﬁrms’ speciﬁc characteristics
determine their default probabilities, as well as their timings. As a consequence, assuming that
we have two vectors of time-varying covariates, Xt and Zit (a systematic and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
component), we must slightly adapt the speciﬁcations presented above, such that:
h(t,X(t),Z(t)) = lim
dt→0
Prob(t ≤ T<t+ dt | T ≥ t,X(t + dt),Z(t + dt))
dt
(15)
where X(t) and Z(t) are the covariates path up to t20.
We begin our survival regression analysis by using a Cox proportional hazard model, such
that:
h(t,X(t),Z(t)) = κ(X(t),Z(t))h0(t) (16)
where κ(.) is a non-negative function of X(t) and Z(t), and h0(t) is deﬁned as the base-
line hazard, which is common to all ﬁrms (individual hazard functions diﬀer from each other
proportionally, as a function of κ(X(t),Z(t)). This is a partly non-parametric approach, given
that we can estimate unknown parameters of κ(.) without specifying the form of the baseline
hazard. Under this setup, the regressors do not aﬀect the shape of the overall hazard function,
conditioning only the relative failure risk of each ﬁrm.
We then extend our analysis by estimating parametric duration models, using several dif-
ferent distribution functions (namely, exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, lognormal, and log-
logistic).
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Results obtained using discrete choice models
In Table 5 we present some of the results obtained using a random-eﬀects probit. The ﬁrst
results presented in this table focus on 71.058 observations, for 24.668 diﬀerent ﬁrms, though
the full sample comprises 113.119 observations for 33.084 ﬁrms (on average, we have 3 years
of observations for each ﬁrm). This diﬀerence results from using variables constructed with
information on the previous year (such as sales growth or the investment rate), which excludes
from the regressions all observations for 1996, as well as those which do not have two consecutive
years of information. Furthermore, several observations have missing values in some of the
20It is important to make a distinction between exogenous and endogenous regressors. According to
Lancaster (1990), a covariate process {x(t)} is exogenous for T if and only if Prob(X(t,t + dt) | T ≥
t + dt,X(t)) =Prob(X(t,t + dt | X(t)). This means that any regressor whose path is determined indepen-
dently of whether any particular agent has defaulted or not is exogenous. In our work, all variables used (both
time-variant and time-invariant) will be considered exogenous.
20variables used, being also naturally excluded from the regression analysis (which explains the
slightly diﬀerent number of observations in some of the models presented). Additionally, we
are excluding from the regression analysis ﬁrms in default for at least two consecutive years,
considering only their ﬁrst default observation, in order to evaluate only new transitions into
the default state (if, however, a ﬁrm defaults twice or more during the sample period, but in
non-consecutive years, these defaults will be considered as new transitions).
Taking into account the mean comparisons between ﬁrms with and without default pre-
sented in Table 3, we started by performing some estimations using a limited set of variables.
The pairwise correlations previously computed were also taken into account, not only to iden-
tify which ﬁrm variables are more correlated with default frequencies, but also to avoid possible
multicollinearity problems. In the ﬁrst model presented in Table 5, the set of explanatory vari-
ables comprises sales growth, return on assets (ROA), a solvency ratio, an investment rate and
a liquidity indicator21. Sales growth displays a negative coeﬃcient, suggesting that ﬁrms with
stronger sales growth rates should have lower default probabilities. Proﬁtability seems to oﬀer
an important contribution in explaining why do some ﬁrms default, exhibiting also a negative
coeﬃcient, as should be expected (more proﬁtable ﬁrms should have a more solid ﬁnancial
situation and, consequently, display lower default probabilities). The solvency ratio, which is
deﬁned as the ratio between equity and total assets, also suggests that ﬁrms with healthier
ﬁnancial conditions are less likely to default on their loan commitments. Moreover, ﬁrms with
stronger investment rates also show lower default probabilities. In fact, it seems reasonable
to admit that ﬁrms under ﬁnancial pressure are not expected to engage in large investment
projects. Finally, the liquidity ratio, deﬁned as short-term assets as a percentage of the ﬁrm’s
total debt, has a negative impact on default probabilities, implying that ﬁrms facing stronger
liquidity constraints may have higher diﬃculties in paying their debt commitments, which is
consistent with the results obtained by Bunn and Redwood (2003) or Benito et al (2004), for
instance.
Even though the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables taken into account seem to play an important role
in predicting loan default, they should be seen as contingent on the ﬁrm’s size, as well as on
the sector in which it operates, given that some variables may be more or less important for
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. Therefore, in model 2 we added sector dummies to our ﬁrst speciﬁcation
(omitting the dummy variable for manufacturing ﬁrms). The results for these sector dummies
suggest that there may be some diﬀerences in credit risk drivers across diﬀerent sectors. Overall,
the coeﬃcients associated with ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial ratios remain robust. Though macroeconomic
variables will be introduced further ahead, we will include for now year dummies (the omitted
dummy is the year 2001), in order to control for any possible systematic eﬀects (model 3).
T h ef a c tt h a tm o s to ft h ec o e ﬃcients for year dummies are signiﬁcant gives support to the
hypothesis that macroeconomic developments may also be important in explaining loan default,
as thoroughly discussed in Section 3. Finally, we also included size dummies (model 4). Though
micro and small ﬁrms seem to have lower default probabilities than larger ﬁrms, conﬁrming the
results obtained with descriptive statistics, these diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Therefore, even though larger ﬁrms display higher default frequencies in our sample, after
21As mentioned above, all ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are described with more detail in Appendix B.
21Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Sales growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
-2.28 -2.68 -2.19 -2.20 -2.16 -1.79 -2.18 -2.52 -0.47 -1.97
ROA -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
-4.73 -4.34 -3.96 -3.95 -3.92 -3.75 -3.93 -3.97 -4.05 -3.66
Solvency ratio -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006
-6.52 -7.15 -7.56 -7.35 -7.36 -11.16 -11.23 -11.24 -11.87 -11.09
Investment rate -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
-5.38 -5.35 -5.01 -4.99 -4.99 -4.44 -4.82 -5.18 -4.52
Liquidity ratio -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001











Available collateral (aprox.) 0.001
1.51
Small -0.044 -0.035 -0.048 -0.006 -0.035 -0.034 -0.044
-0.52 -0.41 -0.58 -0.07 -0.42 -0.41 -0.53
Micro -0.013 -0.001 -0.027 0.014 -0.011 -0.059 -0.025
-0.15 -0.01 -0.32 0.16 -0.13 -0.69 -0.29
Medium -0.026 -0.022 -0.025 0.007 -0.015 -0.005 -0.023
-0.30 -0.25 -0.28 0.07 -0.17 -0.06 -0.27
Fishing 0.351 0.358 0.363 0.360 0.400 0.340 0.431 0.234 0.369
1.48 1.42 1.45 1.43 1.60 1.35 1.74 0.93 1.46
Mining 0.215 0.222 0.223 0.224 0.238 0.204 0.240 0.148 0.228
1.62 1.57 1.57 1.58 1.68 1.43 1.71 1.05 1.60
Agriculture -0.197 -0.191 -0.195 -0.194 -0.181 -0.239 -0.182 -0.306 -0.194
-2.14 -1.95 -1.98 -1.96 -1.82 -2.38 -1.85 -3.07 -1.94
Utilities -0.423 -0.492 -0.500 -0.492 -0.434 -0.786 -0.446 -0.622 -0.473
-1.22 -1.34 -1.36 -1.34 -1.19 -2.06 -1.26 -1.70 -1.29
Construction 0.030 0.040 0.039 0.041 0.028 0.030 0.019 -0.027 0.035
0.64 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.55 0.59 0.37 -0.54 0.67
Commerce -0.303 -0.329 -0.332 -0.332 -0.333 -0.353 -0.356 -0.199 -0.337
-7.28 -7.34 -7.26 -7.25 -7.17 -7.72 -7.78 -4.34 -7.09
Tourism and restaurants -0.120 -0.151 -0.152 -0.154 -0.119 -0.172 -0.107 -0.177 -0.152
-0.87 -1.03 -1.04 -1.05 -0.82 -1.17 -0.75 -1.21 -1.02
Transports and communications -0.011 -0.019 -0.023 -0.023 -0.017 -0.046 -0.027 0.052 -0.030
-0.17 -0.26 -0.32 -0.32 -0.24 -0.64 -0.38 0.73 -0.41
Real estate -0.334 -0.496 -0.502 -0.499 -0.498 -0.574 -0.535 -0.585 -0.505
-2.36 -3.28 -3.32 -3.29 -3.32 -3.80 -3.60 -3.91 -3.36
Education 0.308 0.194 0.190 0.193 0.227 0.232 0.189 0.166 0.190
1.10 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.76 0.78 0.63 0.55 0.64
Healthcare -0.124 -0.286 -0.287 -0.284 -0.257 -0.268 -0.266 -0.253 -0.277
-0.42 -0.91 -0.92 -0.91 -0.82 -0.86 -0.86 -0.81 -0.88
1997 -0.303 -0.303 -0.302 -0.313 -0.291 -0.312 -0.284 -0.313
-5.61 -5.59 -5.56 -5.76 -5.38 -5.76 -5.25 -5.76
1998 -0.229 -0.230 -0.228 -0.235 -0.220 -0.236 -0.206 -0.235
-4.55 -4.55 -4.50 -4.65 -4.36 -4.68 -4.09 -4.65
1999 -0.340 -0.341 -0.339 -0.342 -0.330 -0.343 -0.329 -0.342
-6.38 -6.37 -6.34 -6.39 -6.18 -6.44 -6.15 -6.39
2000 -0.390 -0.390 -0.390 -0.393 -0.389 -0.391 -0.391 -0.393
-6.51 -6.51 -6.51 -6.57 -6.50 -6.56 -6.50 -6.56
2001
2002 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.013 0.002
0.12 0.12 0.11 0.04 -0.03 0.21 -0.26 0.05
Constant -2.377 -2.296 -2.184 -2.153 -2.175 -2.245 -2.336 -2.048 -1.907 -2.304
-36.82 -35.88 -29.42 -20.17 -19.27 -21.55 -21.80 -11.85 -18.61 -21.12
Number of observations 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71078 71406 71078 71406 71078
Number of firms 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24589 24731 24589 24731 24589
Log-likelihood -5574.7 -5531.8 -5484.1 -5483.7 -5483.5 -5468.2 -5503.7 -5481.5 -5404.0 -5471.1
Log-likelihood of the constant only 
model, for this sample -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5721.08 -5763.56 -5719.51 -5763.56 -5763.56
Pseudo-R2 0.030 0.037 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.044 0.045 0.042 0.062 0.051
Observations per group
      min 111 1 111111
      average 2 . 92 . 92 . 9 2 . 9 2 . 92 . 92 . 92 . 92 . 92 . 9
      max 666 6 666666
Wald Chi2 286.9 333.2 346.3 347.0 346.7 348.7 356.6 338.1 412.5 345.8
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.341 0.336 0.397 0.396 0.396 0.397 0.398 0.392 0.389 0.399
Prob >= chibar2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 5 - Probit regressions (dependent variable : dummy credit overdue)
Note: z-scores in italics. All models estimated using a random-effects probit estimator, where the dependent variable is the dummy credit overdue. All ratios used are described in
Appendix B. The pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the model's log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for
the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. Finally, rho measures the proportion of the total
variance resulting from the panel-level variance component.
22controlling for the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation, the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on default probabilities does
not seem to remain signiﬁcant.
Departing from this latter model, we tried several other possibly interesting variables. For
instance, in Section 4.1, we had concluded that ﬁrms with default were, on average, older
than the remaining ﬁrms in the sample. However, ﬁrm age does not seem to be statistically
signiﬁcant under a regression analysis framework (model 5). We also tried to take into account
some productivity measures, such as capital productivity, measured as the ratio of sales to
tangible assets (model 6). Though signiﬁcant, its marginal contribution to explain loan default
is rather small. Nevertheless, it helps to conﬁrm that more productive ﬁrms should have,
on average, lower default probabilities (though the productivity measure used can be highly
sensitive to the sector in which the ﬁrm operates). Given the correlation between this indicator
and sales growth, the latter ceases to be signiﬁcant in this estimation. We also tried to consider
whether capital intensity could help predict default (model 7). Even though the associated
coeﬃcient is very small, there seems to be evidence that ﬁrms more intensive on capital than
on labour should display slightly higher default probabilities. Another variable considered was
the share of tangible assets on ﬁrms’ total non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets. This variable displays
an e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient, implying that the higher the share of tangible assets, the lower is the
default probability, after controlling for the ﬁrm’s economic sector. Nevertheless, the estimated
coeﬃcient for this variable is hardly statistically signiﬁcant. Additionally, ﬁrms with higher
turnover ratios (deﬁned as sales to assets) are, as expected, ﬁrms with lower default risk
(nevertheless, this variable is, to some extent, correlated with sales growth, which ceases to be
signiﬁcant when the turnover ratio is introduced in the regression). Given that the database
does not provide information on the collateral used to guarantee loans, we tried to build an
approximate measure of total available collateral (tangible assets as a percentage of total assets),
but it did not prove to be signiﬁcant in the estimated regression models.
Though most of the variables discussed above have some explanatory power in predicting
loan default, we should focus our analysis on a limited set of variables, which comprehensively
cover the more important dimensions of the ﬁrm’s situation. Model 4 seems to provide a
reasonable compromise between these two aspects, taking into account the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability,
its sales evolution, its ﬁnancial structure, its recent investment policy and its liquidity position,
after controlling for size and economic sector, as well as for time-eﬀects. Hence, this model will
be considered as our baseline speciﬁcation and all further extensions will be built upon it.
In the lower part of Table 5 some additional information on the estimations performed is
displayed. Both the log-likelihood and the pseudo-R2 do not change signiﬁcantly across the
diﬀerent speciﬁcations presented, suggesting that most of these variables have similar contribu-
tions in predicting loan default22. According to the Wald test reported, coeﬃcients are overall
signiﬁcant for the models considered. We also report ρ, which provides a measure of the pro-
portion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component (when ρ is zero,
22The pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the ﬁt, being computed as
−π0−(−π)
−π ,w h e r eπ0 is the log-
likelihood of the constant-only model, for the sample used in the estimation, and π is the log-likelihood of the
estimated regression. This ratio is a measure of the percentage of the variance on the dependent variable that
is captured by the model.
23the panel-level variance component is irrelevant and hence the panel estimator should be equal
to the pooled estimator).
As mentioned above, the estimations presented in Table 5 were obtained using a random-
eﬀects probit. For robustness purposes, we also estimated some of these models using al-
ternative estimation procedures. We ﬁrst used a population-averaged estimator instead of the
random-eﬀects estimator, obtaining minor diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients, though with-
out any qualitative changes23. We have also estimated the same population-averaged model
using robust variance estimates, yielding minor changes in some z-scores (it is not possible to
compute robust variances with a random-eﬀects estimator). In addition, these models were
also estimated using a logit instead of a probit model. The estimated coeﬃcients are, as ex-
pected, slightly less than the double of those estimated with probits. Qualitatively, there are
no signiﬁcant changes when using random-eﬀects and population-averaged estimators within a
logit model. With logit models it also becomes possible to use ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators, though
the results are relatively disappointing, given that only those ﬁrms that eventually default con-
tribute to the likelihood function (as a result, the model focuses only on 771 ﬁrms and both
the magnitude and the signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients change considerably). Finally,
we also tried to estimate the baseline model without imposing a panel data structure. More
speciﬁcally, we estimated three additional simple probit regressions: two using clustered stan-
dard errors (one of them clustering by ﬁrms and other clustering by years) and one without any
clustering procedure (which would imply admitting that all observations are independent both
a c r o s st i m ea n dw i t h i ne a c hﬁrm). The results are broadly similar, with one single exception:
sales growth is not statistically signiﬁcant when observations are clustered only by ﬁrm and
when the clustering procedure is ignored.
The diﬀerent model speciﬁcations outlined in Table 5 help to identify some of the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc determinants of loan default. However, it should also be of interest to evaluate how
the ﬁrm’s past performance aﬀects its default probability, which could help predicting future
defaults. Moreover, given that ﬁrm-speciﬁc data is usually available with a considerable lag,
it becomes crucial to try to assess whether a ﬁrm is likely to become stressed in the future by
evaluating its current ﬁnancial situation. Departing from the baseline speciﬁcation presented
above, in Table 6 we present some additional regressions, using all ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sl a g g e d
by one, two, three and four years, respectively. When all ﬁrm variables are lagged by one
and two years, the results are mainly robust. Most of the coeﬃcients on ﬁrm characteristics
preserve the same signs. The most notable exception is the investment rate, which ceases to be
signiﬁcant when lagged. Moreover, the estimated coeﬃcient for sales growth is not statistically
signiﬁcant when more than two lags are considered, suggesting that only the most recent sales
performance truly conditions ﬁrms’ default probabilities. There seems to be an increase in
the marginal eﬀect of proﬁtability on credit risk, and, conversely, a decrease in the relative
importance of the solvency ratio. Hence, sustained poor proﬁtability ratios over time are a
23For a general model, the main diﬀerence between random-eﬀects and population-averaged estimators is that
the former ﬁtt h em o d e lP r o b (Yit =1| Xit,u i)=F(Xitβ + ui), whereas population-averaged estimators ﬁt
the model Prob(Yit =1| Xit)=G(Xitβ
∗). The subtle diﬀerence is that β and β
∗ are diﬀerent population
parameters: while the former takes into account the same ﬁrm for diﬀerent values of the regressors, the latter
focuses on average ﬁrm values (implying that E(Yit | Xit)=E(Yit | Xi),∀t). For further details on population-
averaged models (also known as generalised estimating equations (GEE) approach) please see Wooldridge (2002).
241 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
Sales growth                       t -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003
-2.20 -2.60 0.23 1.23 0.99 -5.54
t-1 -0.001 -0.001
-2.84 -2.59
ROA                                      t -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003





Solvency ratio                      t -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007





Investment rate                   t -0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005
-4.99 0.17 1.40 0.22 -0.10 -3.62
Liquidity ratio                       t -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
-4.48 -4.68 -3.25 -3.23 -2.39 -3.99
t-1 -0.002
-4.81
Constant -2.153 -2.085 -2.130 -1.951 -1.756 -2.092 -2.083
-20.17 -17.31 -14.28 -10.88 -14.92 -16.90 -17.32
Number of observations 71058 46608 30924 19831 12139 45335 46608
Number of firms 24668 17169 12135 8623 7346 16662 17169
Log-likelihood -5483.7 -3732.2 -2557.2 -1802.0 -1323.2 -3598.3 -3732.2
Log-likelihood of the constant only 
model, for this sample -5746.11 -3879.97 -2659.01 -1870.56 -1354.59 -3797.12 -3879.97
Pseudo-R2 0.046 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.023 0.052 0.038
Observations per group
      min 11 1 1 1 1 1
      average 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 1.7 2.7 2.7
      max 65 4 3 2 5 5
Wald Chi2 347.0 196.4 119.0 65.4 55.7 250.2 196.2
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.396 0.357 0.347 0.244 0.000 0.362 0.358
Prob >= chibar2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.00
Note: z-scores in italics. All regressions include the control dummies for size, sector and year presented in Table 5. All models estimated
using a random-effects probit estimator, where the dependent variable is the dummy credit overdue. All ratios used are described in
Appendix B. The pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the model's log-likelihood and of the log-
likelihood of the constant-only model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients. Finally, rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance
component.
Table 6 - Probit regressions
Baseline 
specification
All firm variables lagged: Models with several 
simultaneous lags
strong sign of ﬁrm distress, yielding possibly high future default probabilities. When variables
are lagged by three and, most notably, by four years, there is a clear decrease in the model’s
quality (most variables are no longer signiﬁcant and the pseudo-R2 decreases considerably),
suggesting that the ﬁrm’s recent performance is, as expected, much more relevant to explain
loan default than its "historical" background.
In addition, we also tried to estimate similar models using simultaneously several time lags.
First we lagged all variables up to four years, considering also the contemporaneous information,
and then we gradually dropped those lags which proved not be signiﬁcant. Then we tried a
more restricted approach, considering only up to three year lags (and no contemporaneous
information). The results are consistent with those previously described. In both cases, only
one and two year lags turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming that using more than
three year lags gives the model much less accuracy. Proﬁtability seems to have the higher
lagged explanatory power, though the liquidity and solvency ratios also provide interesting
information when lagged by one year (however, the solvency ratio shows a rather counter-
intuitive positive coeﬃcient at t − 2). Again, the investment rate fails to be signiﬁcant when
lagged.
25As discussed above, there may be substantial diﬀerences in the determinants of loan default
for ﬁrms of diﬀerent ages, diﬀerent sizes or diﬀerent economic sectors. To better understand
such diﬀerences, we estimated separate regressions for separate groups of ﬁrms. Separating
the ﬁrms into three diﬀerent age groups (young, average and mature ﬁrms), it is possible
to conclude that the estimated model ﬁts better older ﬁrms (most notably those which are
more than 15 years old) than younger ones. In fact, sales growth does not seem to be an
important determinant of loan default for young and average ﬁrms. Furthermore, proﬁtability,
solvency and liquidity are not signiﬁcant for younger ﬁrms. In fact, for these ﬁrms, only the
investment rate remains signiﬁcant. These results suggest that start-up ﬁrms have relatively
diﬀerent determinants of loan default, reﬂecting in part that their capital structure (and, to
some extent, their proﬁtability) should necessarily be diﬀerent than that of older ﬁrms. Taking
into account ﬁrms with diﬀerent dimensions, the estimates performed suggest that the baseline
model has a better ﬁt for small and medium ﬁrms. Sales growth and liquidity do not seem to
be important in explaining default probabilities of micro ﬁrms. In contrast, the only clearly
signiﬁcant explanatory variable for large ﬁrms is the liquidity ratio. Estimating the model
separately for diﬀerent economic sectors also yields some interesting results. The performance
of the model for manufacturing ﬁrms is remarkably good. For commerce ﬁrms, some of the
variables considered do not seem to be signiﬁcant, namely sales growth, liquidity and, to a lesser
extent, the proﬁtability ratio. For some of the other sectors considered, the performance of the
model is weaker, in part because there are fewer observations. Nonetheless, these results conﬁrm
that default probabilities are driven by diﬀerent factors in diﬀerent economic sectors. From all
the variables considered, the solvency ratio seems to be the most robust variable in predicting
default probabilities across diﬀerent sectors, suggesting that the ﬁrm’s capital structure is an
important determinant of loan default in most economic activity sectors, whereas sales growth
or proﬁtability, for instance, are more important determinants of loan default in some sectors
than in others.
In Section 3 we discussed some of the links between loan default and macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial developments, at an aggregate level. In this section we have considered several ﬁrm
characteristics that may contribute to understand why some ﬁrms default. Now, ﬁnally, we
will try to simultaneously assess the role played by macroeconomic factors, together with
ﬁrms’ speciﬁc characteristics, by adding a set of macroeconomic variables to our panel data
regressions. We considered a relatively large set of variables, taking into account some of the
conclusions drawn in Section 3. Some of the variables tested in the regressions were GDP (level
and growth), the coincident economic activity indicator, exports, private consumption, gross
ﬁxed capital formation, employment, loan growth, an exchange rate index, 10-year bond yields,
the yield curve slope, banks interest rates applied on loans to ﬁrms, and stock market prices
variation. Some of these variables did not prove to be signiﬁcant or displayed unexpected signs.
The most insightful results are presented in Table 7. From all the variables considered, the
most important seem to be the GDP growth rate (with a negative contemporaneous impact
on default probabilities, in agreement with what was discussed previously), the coincident
economic activity indicator (which also evaluates economic conditions), loan growth (which
also displays a negative coeﬃcient) and, ﬁnally, stock market prices variation (implying, as
26Model 5 Model 6 Model 5 Model 6
Sales growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
-2.67 -2.20 -2.12 -2.14 -2.21 -2.33 -2.18 -2.21 -0.72 -2.65 -2.59 0.23 0.23
ROA -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
-4.30 -3.95 -3.93 -3.96 -3.90 -4.16 -3.94 -3.94 -1.63 -3.60 -3.58 -3.09 -3.09
Solvency ratio -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
-7.06 -7.35 -7.37 -7.35 -7.34 -7.23 -7.37 -7.32 -3.08 -3.57 -3.61 -3.21 -3.21
Investment rate -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
-5.35 -4.99 -4.99 -4.99 -4.91 -5.25 -4.97 -4.95 -2.45 0.19 0.17 1.40 1.40
Liquidity ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
-4.52 -4.48 -4.46 -4.47 -4.50 -4.44 -4.49 -4.49 -4.28 -4.71 -4.68 -3.25 -3.25
Interest rate on loans to firms 0.026 0.111 0.117
2.26 4.10 1.66
Yield curve slope (10 y - 3 m) -0.159 0.043 -0.884
-3.43 0.25 -2.85
Loan growth -0.023 -0.019 -0.026 0.043 -0.129
-8.34 -6.02 -1.45 3.39 -2.74
Stock market price variation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.029
-4.86 -3.48 -0.41 -4.27
GDP growth rate -0.087 -0.141
-7.54 -6.47
Coincident indicator BP -0.061 -0.075 -0.325 -0.284
-7.14 -7.07 -5.96 -3.11
Sales growth * GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.16
ROA * GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.16
Solvency ratio * GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.35
Investment rate * GDP growth rate 0.000
0.26













Constant -2.241 -2.153 -2.093 -2.192 -1.872 -2.274 -1.755 -2.321 -1.935 -1.660 -2.983 2.664 -5.821
-23.26 -20.17 -20.38 -21.40 -17.64 -22.45 -14.57 -19.71 -16.78 -7.36 -9.15 1.90 -3.82
Number of observations 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 46608 46608 30924 30924
Number of firms 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 17169 17169 12135 12135
Log-likelihood -5531.2 -5483.7 -5500.3 -5503.9 -5494.1 -5518.6 -5487.0 -5501.4 -5495.5 -3754.0 -3732.2 -2557.2 -2557.2
Log-likelihood of the constant only 
model, for this sample -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -3879.97 -3879.97 -2659.01 -2659.01
Pseudo-R2 0.037 0.046 0.043 0.042 0.044 0.040 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.032 0.038 0.038 0.038
Likelihood ratio test: model 
vs baseline without time 
dummies - 95.0 61.8 54.7 74.3 25.2 88.4 59.7 - - - - -
Observations per group
      min 1 1 1111111 1 1 1 1
      average 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5
      max 6 6 6666666 5 5 4 4
Wald Chi2 333.8 347.0 330.3 327.3 345.7 323.3 344.3 338.3 336.2 181.6 196.4 119.0 119.0
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.336 0.396 0.393 0.392 0.384 0.371 0.395 0.383 0.395 0.331 0.357 0.347 0.347
Prob >= chibar2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00





Model 5 Model 6
All firm and macro variables lagged:





Note: z-scores in italics. All regressions include the control dummies for size and sector presented in Table 5. All models estimated using a random-effects probit estimator, where the dependent variable is the dummy 
credit overdue. All ratios used are described in Appendix B. The pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the model's log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only 
model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-
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Model 7
previously discussed, that positive developments in stock market prices, which usually reﬂect
an improvement in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial conditions, are associated with lower default probabilities).
All these variables display relatively high marginal eﬀects on default probabilities.
These ﬁrst regressions were estimated by taking into account each macroeconomic variable
separately, in order to minimise the losses in terms of information provided by ﬁrm heterogene-
ity. However, we also tried to take into account the joint eﬀect of diﬀerent macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial variables (models 5 and 6 in Table 7). In model 5 we considered loan growth, stock
market prices variation and the slope of the yield curve. The slope of the yield curve, which
may reﬂect, to some extent, expectations on future economic growth, has a strong negative
marginal eﬀect on default probabilities. When the variables considered in model 5 are lagged
by one year (together with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables), the results are relatively disappointing,
given that none of them remains statistically signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, when we consider two
27year lags the results improve signiﬁcantly (the marginal eﬀect of the yield curve slope increases,
conﬁrming the forward-looking properties of this variable). Given the poor performance of this
model when one year lags are taken into account, we estimated a diﬀerent model (model 6), now
considering interest rates on bank loans (which show, as expected, a positive contemporaneous
coeﬃcient), the coincident economic activity indicator and loan growth (which is automatically
dropped when variables are used contemporaneously, given their high correlation). This model
yields much better results when lagged by one year, but when two-year lags are used only the
coincident indicator remains signiﬁcant. It is interesting to notice that, contrary to what was
suggested when we focused on aggregate time series in Section 3, the coeﬃcient of economic
growth (here proxied by the economic activity indicator) does not become positive when lagged
by two years. Hence, even if at an aggregate level it seems to be clear that signiﬁcant imbalances
are created in periods of strong economic growth, after controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc character-
istics this relationship is no longer apparent, possibly reﬂecting an asymmetric behaviour of
ﬁrms with diﬀerent characteristics during diﬀerent phases of the credit cycle.
Given that ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial ratios are also subject to sizeable ﬂuctuations over the business
cycle, we tried to explicitly model these co-movements by adding to the model interactions
between ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and the GDP growth rate (model 7). The only signiﬁcant
interaction variable is the one associated with the liquidity indicator, suggesting that these
interactions do not play a crucial role in explaining default probabilities. The GDP growth
rate remains signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcient associated with sales growth and ROA cease to be
statistically signiﬁcant in this model. However, when these two variables are excluded from the
regression, their respective interaction with the GDP growth rate turns out signiﬁcant.
As mentioned above, all the macroeconomic variables display relatively high marginal eﬀects
on default probabilities. To accurately assess the importance of macroeconomic conditions
on default probabilities, we should begin by comparing the model without any time controls
to the model with time dummies and to the models with macroeconomic variables. One
important thing to notice is that the estimated coeﬃcients and the z-scores for the ﬁrm speciﬁc
variables almost do not change in all these speciﬁcations. This result suggests that the relevant
information contained in macroeconomic variables is largely independent from that contained
in ﬁrm speciﬁc variables. The incremental information provided by the inclusion of the time
dimension can be conﬁrmed by the signiﬁcant increase in the pseudo-R2 of the model which
includes time dummies, by comparison with a model without time controls. The substitution
of these time dummies by speciﬁc macroeconomic variables (which can only capture part of the
v a r i a t i o ne n c l o s e di nt i m ed u m m i e s )d o e sn o ty i e l ds i g n i ﬁcant changes in the model’s overall
goodness of ﬁt, suggesting that these macroeconomic variables can capture an important part
of the time variation implicit in the year dummies. In order to more accurately test the role
performed by the inclusion of time eﬀects in the determination of default probabilities, we
also performed likelihood ratio tests. The inclusion of year dummies allows for a signiﬁcant
increase in the likelihood of the model. When only one macroeconomic variable is considered
(models 1 to 4), the change in the likelihood of the model is also very signiﬁcant. Loan growth
and GDP growth rate are the variables which have a higher impact on the model’s likelihood.
In fact, their explanatory power is not much lower than that of linear time controls. The
28additional explanatory power provided by the inclusion of three macroeconomic variables in
model 5 is very similar to that of the time dummies. Hence, these results allow us to conclude
t h a tm a c r o e c o n o m i cd y n a m i c sh a v ea ni m p o r t a n tadditional (and independent) contribution
in explaining why do ﬁrms default.
Finally, we performed some robustness checks, in order to test the validity of the results
obtained. In the sample there are ﬁrms with multiple defaults and, as previously mentioned,
only new transitions into the default state are being considered (if a ﬁrm is in default for
more than two consecutive years, it is excluded from the regression as long as the default state
persists). Taking into account the results obtained using conditional transition matrices, we
have reasons to believe that ﬁrms with previous defaults may be riskier than other ﬁrms. To
conﬁrm this, we started by including in our sample all default observations (even if the ﬁrm is
in default for more than two consecutive years). In this new sample, which includes more 391
ﬁrms, the results are generally robust, with the exception of proﬁtability, which is no longer
signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that the model’s goodness of ﬁti m p r o v e s
considerably. To better understand the diﬀerences in the behaviour of ﬁrms with past loan
defaults, we estimated a separate regression only for ﬁrms which were in default at t − 1.F o r
the 1.236 ﬁrms considered in this regression, credit risk drivers seem to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
the ones considered in our base sample. In fact, the only ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables that remain
statistically signiﬁcant are the solvency ratio and the investment rate. We further extended
this sample to include ﬁrms with at least one previous default during the sample period (even
if not at t − 1). This model performs slightly better (the pseudo-R2 increases considerably,
as well as the proportion of the total variance captured by the panel level component). In
addition to the solvency ratio and the investment rate, sales growth also becomes signiﬁcant.
Hence, ﬁrms with previous defaults which record relatively low solvency ratios, low investment
rates and low sales growth should be much riskier than other ﬁrms.
Also for robustness purposes, we tested the impact of slightly changing the deﬁnition of the
dependent variable, by considering that there was default only when credit overdue was above
100 euro, 1000 euro or 1 per cent of total debt, in order to focus only on more serious default
problems. The estimation results remain broadly unchanged, though the model’s explanatory
power seems to improve slightly. The strikingly bimodal distribution of the credit overdue
ratio which, as illustrated on Figure 2, displays either very high or very low values was also
taken into account in the regressions, in order to test whether these diﬀerent default events are
driven by the same determinants. As discussed above, low credit overdue ratios should reﬂect
mostly transitory episodes of deliquency, which may easily be reverted. When we only take
into account default events in which this ratio is below 50 per cent of the ﬁrms’ total bank
debt, most of the variables considered retain their explanatory power. The only exception is
sales growth, which is no longer signiﬁcant. In turn, when only more serious default episodes
are considered (credit overdue ratio above 50 per cent), both proﬁtability and liquidity cease
to be statistically signiﬁcant.
Still for robustness purposes, we considered other modelling techniques, namely an ordered
probit and a simple OLS with an alternative dependent variable. Concerning the ordered
probit model, we deﬁned diﬀerent levels of default severity by constructing intervals for the
29ratio of credit overdue to total credit. The results are broadly consistent with those previously
presented, showing only minor diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients. In addition to this,
we considered an alternative model where the ratio of credit overdue to total credit was the
dependent variable, instead of the binary dependent variable considered so far (this model
was estimated within a simple panel data OLS framework). Again, the results are fairly
robust, except in what concerns the liquidity ratio, which presents a counter-intuitive positive
coeﬃcient.
Recalling that we had controlled for outliers by setting observations above the 1st and 99th
percentiles equal to the value of that percentile, we also tested the impact on the estimated
regressions of running an alternative procedure for eliminating outliers, more speciﬁcally, by
deleting the observations above or below those percentiles. The results are broadly consistent,
but the change in the proﬁtability coeﬃcient, which becomes much stronger, should not be
ignored. Finally, we also tested the introduction of some non-linearities in the model, by
considering the squared value of some variables, as well as some interactions between variables.
However, the marginal eﬀect of the squared variables is almost negligible and does not seem
to add much to the model. Moreover, the variable interactions tested were not statistically
signiﬁcant.
4.3.2 Results obtained using duration models
The way the data are organised and declared is very important in survival analysis models.
Given that our database has strong left-censoring problems, this is a particularly important
issue. In fact, most ﬁrms included in the sample were created before 1996, though in our
database we do not have any information about their historical record, more speciﬁcally, we
do not know whether those ﬁrms have defaulted before that year. This problem can be partly
accounted for by declaring that ﬁrms are considered to be at risk since their creation date,
though that failure risk can be observable only after the ﬁrm enters the sample (which may
eventually be after 1996). In these models, our variable of interest will be the time until
default, rather than a binary variable indicating whether the ﬁrm has defaulted or not. After
organising the dataset according to these constraints, we are left with a sample of 32.966 ﬁrms,
for which we have an average of 3.3 years of information. There are 1.921 observed defaults in
this sample. The incidence rate, deﬁned as the number of defaults divided by the total number
of observations, is 1.8 per cent.
Given the left-censoring problems underlying our sample, we also tried to consider only
those ﬁrms created from 1996 onwards, thus totally eliminating left-censoring. This implies
focusing on a much smaller set of ﬁrms (3.284 ﬁrms, for which we observe only 94 defaults).
The incidence rate for these ﬁrms is slightly lower, standing at 1.4 per cent. Figure 4 de-
picts several estimated functions for this subset of ﬁrms. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
shows a steady decreasing trend, given that survival probabilities decrease over time. The
most interesting results are those provided by the smoothed hazard estimate, suggesting that
default probabilities are strongly increasing over time during the ﬁrst 4 years of the ﬁrm’s life.
Afterwards, the hazard rate starts to decrease, resulting in a hump-shaped smoothed hazard
estimate. These results shed some light on the previous discussions concerning the impact of
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ﬁrm age on default probabilities. In fact, it can be conﬁrmed, to some extent, that default
probabilities increase with ﬁrm age, though it is now clear that such increase is not linear
through the ﬁrm’s lifetime. Recalling from Section 4.2 that it can be said that there is positive
duration dependence when
δh(t)
δt > 0, ∀t (as deﬁned in equation 13), we cannot aﬃrm that
there is strictly positive duration dependence, given that for older ﬁrms we have
δh(t)
δt < 024.
Within the framework of duration modelling, we estimated several regression models, in a
spirit similar to that of discrete choice models. We started by ﬁtting Cox proportional hazard
models. The results obtained, presented in Table 8, are broadly similar to those obtained
with probit models: ﬁrms with higher sales growth, higher proﬁtability, higher solvency, higher
investment rates, and better liquidity ratios display lower default probabilities (or, to be more
precise, take a longer time to eventually default on their loan commitments). However, sales
growth turns out to be clearly non-signiﬁcant in the estimates performed when considering
robust variance estimates. Hence, though sales growth may contribute to explain why some
ﬁrms default, it does not seem to determine the time until default, at least under a Cox
proportional hazard speciﬁcation. In order to conﬁrm the legitimate use of Cox models, we
tested the proportional hazards assumption. Global and individual tests for the estimated
regressions provide no evidence that the proportional hazards assumption is violated.
Given the strong left-censoring in the database, we also tested whether ﬁrms created from
1996 onwards were substantially diﬀerent from others. In order to achieve that, we estimated
a Cox model including a dummy variable for such ﬁrms (model 3 in Table 8). This dummy
variable is far from being signiﬁcant, suggesting that these ﬁrms do not substantially diﬀer
from the remaining ﬁrms in the sample. Nevertheless, to more deeply address this problem,
we also estimated Cox regressions for this sub-sample, which are also displayed in Table 8.
Both the solvency ratio and the investment rate cease to be signiﬁcant. As argued above, these
results suggest that start-up ﬁrms have relatively diﬀerent determinants of loan default (in
our sample, these ﬁrms show higher investment rates, as would be expected, as well as higher
leverage ratios25). In order to complete our assessment, we tested the inclusion of other micro
24Estimating hazard rates for the full sample comprises signiﬁcant problems, given the abovementioned left-
censoring issue. Nevertheless, the estimates performed for the full sample also result in a hump-shaped hazard
function. Default probabilities are clearly increasing during the ﬁrst 25 years of the ﬁrm’s life. Afterwards,
default probabilities continue to increase, though at a less marked rate. Finally, for considerably older ﬁrms
(more than 75 years), the hazard rate starts to decrease.
25Though higher leverage ratios are usually associated with higher default probabilities, as discussed above,
in the ﬁrst years of the ﬁrm’s life a high level of indebtedness may be required to fund its initial investments,
31Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Sales growth 0.998 1.003
-1.72 1.54
ROA 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.992
-4.33 -4.83 -4.84 -2.44 -2.31 -2.31 -2.02 -1.79 -2.36 -2.37 -2.17 -2.49
Solvency ratio 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.003 1.003 1.003 1.000 1.005 1.003 1.002 1.003
-4.59 -4.56 -4.53 0.74 0.78 0.74 -0.06 1.29 0.70 0.59 0.77
Investment rate 0.990 0.989 0.989 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
-3.94 -4.10 -4.12 -1.23 -1.02 -1.02 -1.00 -1.47 -1.04 -1.04 -1.08 -1.02
Liquidity ratio 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.993 0.986 0.990 0.990 0.990
-4.53 -4.51 -4.54 -3.94 -4.04 -4.04 -3.89 -2.97 -5.01 -3.99 -3.97 -3.98
Leverage 0.997
-0.78






Activity began after 1996 (Y/N) 0.962
-0.23




Stock market price variation 1.005
0.98
Constant --- ------ - - -
Log pseudo likelihood -7291.3 -7294.0 -7294.3 -434.1 -435.3 -435.3 -428.4 -429.9 -428.2 -437.2 -437.2 -436.8
No. of observations 76292 76292 76292 3847 3847 3847 3802 3847 3802 3847 3847 3847
No. of subjects 25690 25690 25690 2324 2324 2324 2297 2324 2297 2324 2324 2324
No. of failures 1000 1000 1000 68 68 68 67 68 67 68 68 68
Time at risk 76292 76292 76292 3847 3847 3847 3802 3847 3802 3847 3847 3847
Wald chi2 583.9 581.4 577.9 35.7 34.2 34.2 35.2 39.9 44.8 31.5 31.0 31.3
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Full sample New firms
Note: z-scores in italics. New firms are defined as those created from 1996 onwards. The regressions for the full sample include the control dummies for size, sector and year
presented in Table 5. All models estimated using a Cox regression which evaluates the time until default, using robust variance estimates. All ratios used are described in Appendix
B. An estimated coefficient lower than 1 should be interpreted as contributing a longer time until default eventually occurs. The Wald test evaluates the overall significance of the
estimated coefficients.
Table 8 - Cox regressions (hazard ratios), robust
and macro variables. Most of the variables tested do not seem to be statistically signiﬁcant in
the determination of the time until default of these start-up ﬁrms. The only relevant exception
seems to be the turnover ratio. According to the results obtained with these regressions, ﬁrms
with lower turnover ratios should default sooner than other ﬁrms. None of the macroeconomic
variables tested is signiﬁcant.
Finally, in order to complete our analysis, we estimated parametric duration models, using
several diﬀerent distribution functions (namely, exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, lognormal,
and log-logistic). The results for one of the estimated models for the sub-sample of start-up
ﬁrms are displayed in Table 9. The estimated coeﬃcients are broadly robust across the diﬀerent
distribution functions considered and do not diﬀer substantially from those obtained using a
Cox proportional hazard model. It should be noted that some of the estimated coeﬃcients
are displayed as proportional hazard ratios (PH), whereas others are presented as accelerated
failure-time coeﬃcients (AFT). The latter present signs opposite to those obtained with the Cox
models because they have a diﬀerent interpretation. Accelerated failure-time models change
t h et i m es c a l eb yaf a c t o ro fexp(−Xiβ), in a general model. A positive coeﬃcient implies
an acceleration of time, which is the same as an increase in the expected waiting time until
without implying necessarily a higher default probability. Nevertheless, for an older ﬁrm, a highly leveraged
ﬁnancial structure, when combined with a deterioration in other ﬁnancial ratios, may signal increased credit
risk, as illustrated in the regressions presented for the full sample.
32Gompertz Lognormal Log-logistic Cox model
PH AFT PH AFT PH AFT AFT
Sales growth ---- - - - -
ROA 0.993 0.007 0.989 0.003 0.989 0.004 0.003 0.992
-2.25 2.25 -2.94 2.36 -2.96 2.34 2.34 -2.31
Solvency ratio 1.002 -0.002 1.005 -0.001 1.005 -0.001 -0.001 1.003
0.71 -0.71 1.22 -1.30 1.22 -0.58 -1.25 0.78
Investment rate 0.994 0.006 0.996 0.001 0.996 0.000 0.001 0.994
-1.04 1.04 -0.72 0.78 -0.71 -0.15 0.72 -1.02
Liquidity ratio 0.990 0.010 0.990 0.002 0.989 0.003 0.002 0.990
-4.06 4.06 -4.04 2.93 -4.07 3.23 2.94 -4.04
Constant - 3.151 - 2.093 - 2.443 2.079 -
9.59 13.42 11.36 13.63
Log-likelihood -261.0 -261.0 -237.6 -237.6 -245.1 -241.3 -237.8 -435.3
No. of observations 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847
No. of subjects 2324 2324 2324 2324 2324 2324 2324 2324
No. of failures 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
Time at risk 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847
LR chi2 33.3 33.3 44.2 259.9 42.9 146.8 248.1 34.2
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AIC 542.06 542.06 497.20 497.20 512.15 504.68 497.58
Exponential Weibull
Table 9 - Parametric survival models for new firms, robust
Note: z-scores in italics. New firms are defined as those created from 1996 onwards. All regressions include year control dummies. The models
presented in this table were estimated parametrically, using the exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, log-normal and log-logistic distributions, using
robust variance estimates. PH stands for proportional hazard ratios. In this case, an estimated coefficient lower than 1 should be interpreted as
contributing to lower default probabilities or, more precisely, to a longer time until default eventually occurs. In turn, AFT stands for accelerated
failure-time coefficients. A positive coefficient implies an acceleration of time, which is the same as an increase in the expected waiting time until
default. All ratios used are described in Appendix B. The LR/Wald test evaluates the overall significance of the estimated coefficients. AIC stands
for Akaike Information Criteria.
default. The Akaike information criteria (AIC) suggests that the Weibull and the log-logistic
distributions are the ones which provide more accurate results26.
Finally, an additional eﬀort conducted to overcome the left-censoring problem was to gather
information from the Central Credit Register on loan defaults observed between 1980 and 1995
for the ﬁrms included in the sample. As a result, 226 new defaults were taken into account.
Using this new information, we still declare that ﬁrms are at risk since their creation date,
though now we can observe their failure since 1980. Hence, if a ﬁrm defaulted between 1980
and 1995, it will now be excluded from the regressions, given that it failed before entering
our observation window. Using this additional information allows to fully overcome the left-
censoring problem, given that we can argue that a default that occurred before 1980 will
hardly condition the ﬁrm’s default probability from 1996 onwards. The results using this
default history are broadly consistent with those obtained when the full default history was
not taken into account. Hence, though we have concluded that ﬁr m sw i t hp r e v i o u sd e f a u l t s
are more likely to default again in the future, the inclusion of a longer default history does not
seem to seriously aﬀect regression results.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This work focused on the determinants of credit risk, both at an aggregate and at a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
level. On one hand, we tried to understand how systematic factors, which simultaneously aﬀect
all ﬁrms, condition the evolution of aggregate default rates. On the other hand, we examined
how ﬁrms’ speciﬁc characteristics aﬀect their default probabilities.
26The Akaike information criteria is computed as AIC = −2π +2× (c + p +1 ) ,w h e r eπ is the estimated
log-likelihood of the model, c is the number of explanatory variables and p is the number of ancillary parameters
(p is an output of the estimation).
33We started by exploring the links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments at
an aggregate level. The results obtained suggest that there are some important links between
credit risk and macroeconomic developments. In fact, these results seem to conﬁrm the hypoth-
esis that in periods of economic growth, which are sometimes accompanied by strong credit
growth, there may be some tendency towards excessive risk-taking. However, the imbalances
created in such periods only become apparent when economic growth slows down.
After examining the determinants of credit risk at an aggregate level, we focused our at-
t e n t i o no na ne x t e n s i v ed a t a s e tw i t hd e t a i l e dﬁnancial information for more than 30.000 ﬁrms,
which also includes their loan default record. The results obtained suggest that default proba-
bilities are inﬂuenced by several ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such as their ﬁnancial structure,
proﬁtability and liquidity, as well as by their recent sales performance or their investment pol-
icy. After controlling for the most relevant ﬁrm-characteristics, the ﬁrm’s dimension does not
seem to contribute to explain diﬀerences in default frequencies, though there are some impor-
tant diﬀerences between economic sectors. Lagged information on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation
over a short period also seems to be important in explaining why do some ﬁrms default on
their loan commitments. Furthermore, the ﬁrm’s default history should be taken into account
in the assessment of its credit risk, given that ﬁrms which recorded loan defaults in the recent
past seem to display much higher default probabilities than other ﬁrms.
Finally, when time-eﬀect controls or macroeconomic variables are taken into account to-
gether with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, the results of the models seem to improve consider-
ably. Hence, even though the determinants of loan default at the micro level are ultimately
driven by the ﬁrms’ speciﬁc ﬁnancial situation, there are important relationships between over-
all macroeconomic conditions and default rates, which should be assessed from a ﬁnancial
stability perspective. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that ultimately the ﬁrms’ ﬁ-
nancial situation is also exposed to systematic shocks in the economy, thereby aﬀecting their
individual default probabilities. Hence, some ﬁrms may be more vulnerable to those system-
atic shocks (as a consequence of the sector in which they operate or of their current ﬁnancial
situation), explaining the ﬂuctuation of aggregate default rates over the business cycle.
Though this work envisaged a thorough empirical examination of credit risk drivers, both
at the macro and micro level, many issues could still be addressed on further research. In
what concerns econometric estimation procedures, a quantile regression framework could help
to better explore some of the conclusions drawn when assessing diﬀerences between ﬁrms,
though the application of this technique to panel datasets is still not straightforward. Another
interesting research topic would be to explicitly model and estimate the interaction between
macroeconomic developments and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Finally, the extension of the
sample period used for assessing credit risk drivers at the ﬁrm-level could provide interesting
results, by taking into account at least one full business cycle.
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37Appendix A: Macroeconomic and ﬁnancial data
Series Source Available since
Loans and non-performing loans Banco de Portugal (Monetary and Financial Statistics) 1979Q4
Credit overdue and provisions Banco de Portugal 1990Q1
Banco de Portugal 
1 1977Q1
Consumer price index (CPI) INE 1977Q1
Banco de Portugal 
2 1978Q1
Bank interest rates Banco de Portugal 
3 1990Q1
Stock market data Euronext 1990Q1
Government bond yields
4 Reuters 1990Q1
           4) Government bond yields for Germany available only since 1991Q1 (for 5 years bonds) and 1992Q1 (for 
10 years bonds).
           3) Monetary and financial statistics and "New series on banks' interest rates: long series for the average 
rates on outstanding amounts", Banco de Portugal Economic Bulletin, December 2003.
           2) Rua, A. (2004), "A new coincident indicator for the Portuguese economy", Banco de Portugal Economic 
Bulletin, June 2004.
Macroeconomic and financial data
National accounts and labour 
market data (quarterly)
Monthly coincident indicator for 
economic activity
Notes: 1) Castro, G. and Esteves, P. (2004), "Quarterly series for the Portuguese economy: 1977-2003", Banco 
de Portugal Economic Bulletin, June 2004.
38Appendix B: Microeconomic variables
Name Description
Profitability
ROA Net income / Total assets x 100
ROE Net income / Equity x 100
Operational results as % of equity Operational results / Equity x 100
Financial structure and leverage
Solvency ratio Equity / Total assets x 100
Total credit as a % assets Total loans (credit register) / Total assets x 100
Total credit as a % equity Total loans (credit register) / Equity x 100
Leverage (Total assets - Equity) / Total assets x 100
Dummy "has long-term credit"
Productivity
Labour productivity Sales / Number of employees x 100
Capital productivity Sales / Tangible assets x 100
K_L coefficient Tangible assets / Number of employees (euro per person)
Investment
Fixed assets Tangible assets + Intangible assets + Financial assets
Investment rate Annual variation in net fixed assets / Sales  x 100
Share of tangible assets Tangible assets as percentage of total tangible and intangible assets
Liquidity
Liquidity ratio
Liquid assets to total assets
Other
Sales growth Year-on-year growth rate of total sales
Credit overdue
Available collateral (proxy) Tangible assets / Total assets x 100
Turnover ratio Sales / Total assets x 100
Firm size Defined accordingly with the European Commision Recommendation of 6 May 2003 
(2003/361/EC), by taking into account the number of employees and sales volume.
Microeconomic variables
Includes principal not paid for more than 30 days after its due date, as well as the 
respective interest and costs due. The dummy credit overdue takes the value 1 
whenever there is a positive amount of credit overdue recorded in the Central Credit 
Register at the end of the year.
This variable assumes the value 1 whenever some of the firm's credit liabilities are 
recorded in the Credit Register as medium or long term
(Bank deposits and cash + Debt receivables + Inventories + Short-term 
investments) / Debt payables x 100
(Bank deposits and cash + Debt receivables + Inventories + Short-term 
investments) / Total assets x 100
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